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Abstract
We revisit the classical question on economic integration and income conver-
gence in a two-sector OLG model with financial frictions and sectoral heterogeneity
in minimum investment requirements (MIR, hereafter). The extensive margin of
investment is a critical channel through which aggregate income may become a
determinant of comparative advantage. Free trade allows the rich (poor) coun-
try to specialize partially or completely in the high-MIR (low-MIR) sector which
has a high (low) return endogenously. The specialization effect interacts with the
neoclassical effect, which may lead to income divergence among inherently identi-
cal countries. Similarly, financial integration may also lead to income divergence
through the extensive-margin channel.
We then revisit the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Antras and Caballero (2009)
show that, given cross-country and cross-sector differences in financial frictions,
free trade alone cannot deliver factor price equalization, while allowing both trade
and capital flows can do so. In our model, if free trade induces the rich coun-
tries to specialize completely in the high-return sector, the credit market condition
changes fundamentally and so does the interest rate determination. In this case,
moving from autarky to free trade does not reverse the cross-country interest rate
differentials and the direction of capital flows, and allowing both trade and capital
flows does not lead to factor price equalization and income convergence. This way,
our findings complement Antras-Caballero’s results and refine the condition for the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem.
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1 Introduction
The recent literature provides the comprehensive empirical evidence that financial devel-
opment matters for international trade (Ahn, Amiti, and Weinstein, 2011; Beck, 2002,
2003; Manova, 2008, 2013; Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2005). Chor and Manova (2012) analyze
the collapse of international trade flows during the global financial crisis and show that
credit conditions were an important channel through which the financial crisis affected
trade volumes. A small but growing theoretical literature investigates the role of financial
sector in determining the patterns of production and trade (Antras and Caballero, 2009,
2010; Ju and Wei, 2005; Kletzer and Bardhan, 1987). Ju and Wei (2011) show that,
in the countries with low-quality institutions, the quality of financial system is an inde-
pendent source of comparative advantage. Wynne (2005) shows that a country’s wealth
can be an important determinant of comparative advantage when access to credit differs
across sectors of the economy. In particular, wealthier nations exhibit a comprehensive
advantage towards goods produced in sectors facing more severe financial imperfections.
These theoretical models share three common features. First, the cross-sector and the
cross-country differences in financial frictions lead to the cross-country differences in the
sectoral output prices, which then drives trade flows. Second, the mass of investors in
each sector is exogenous so that the sectoral investment adjusts only on the intensive
margin.1 Third, there exists a unique steady state under autarky as well as under free
trade. Thus, the impacts of trade integration are unambiguous.
This paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, we embed the Heckscher-
Ohlin model in an OLG framework where the two sectors are subject to the same degree of
financial frictions but the different minimum investment requirements (MIR, hereafter).
The mass of investors in each sector is endogenous so that the sectoral investment
adjusts also on the extensive margin. The extensive margin is the key channel through
which aggregate income may become a determinant of comparative advantage and then,
free trade allows the country with a high (low) income to specialize partially or completely
in the high-MIR, high-return (low-MIR, low-return) sector. The specialization effect
interacts with the neoclassical effect, which may lead to multiple steady states for a small
open economy and income divergence among inherently identical countries. Similarly,
financial integration may also lead to income divergence through the extensive margin.
Second, we revisit the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Antras and Caballero (2009) show
that, given the cross-sector and cross-country differences in financial frictions, allowing
both trade and capital flows leads to factor price equalization and income convergence.
In our model, free trade may lead to the complete specialization of the rich countries in
the high-return sector, which fundamentally changes their credit market condition and
interest rate determination. In this case, allowing both trade and capital flows does not
lead to factor price equalization and income convergence. Thus, we complement Antras-
Caballero’s results and further refine the condition for the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.
The sector-specific MIR and the economy-wide financial frictions are the two key
elements of our model. In the literature, the MIR is used to capture the investment indi-
1The sectoral investment depends on the investment size of individual agents (the intensive margin)
and the mass of investors in a particular sector (the extensive margin).
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visibility at the individual level, which is a important feature of business ideas, physical
and human capital (Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Banerjee and Moll, 2010; Banerjee and
Newman, 1993; Chesnokova, 2007; Galor and Zeira, 1993; Matsuyama, 2000; Piketty,
1997). Recently, Erosa and Hidalgo-Cabrillana (2008), Barseghyan and DiCecio (2011),
Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011), Manova (2013), and Midrigan and Xu (2014) introduce
the fixed cost or the entry cost at the firm level and show that the individual investment is
above a minimum scale in equilibrium. In the presence of either the MIR or the fixed cost,
the individual production set is non-convex,2 and, if financial frictions are also present, a
change in aggregate income affects the individual’s net wealth and the mass of investors
so that aggregate investment adjusts on the extensive margin. Assuming the MIR allows
us to characterize the dynamic properties in the entire parameter spaces.
1.1 Model Structure and Intuitions
Consider an overlapping-generation model with two-period lived agents who have the
labor endowment when young and consume when old. Labor and capital are hired in
two sectors, A and B, to produce final good A and B, respectively, which are used for
consumption and investment in the CES form. The investment is sector-specific and the
resulting capital is available in the next period. The model deviates from the standard
OLG framework in three aspects. First, all agent are endowed with the linear investment
technology, subject to the MIR, i.e., the individual’s investment size must be no less than
a specific value. The two sectors differ in the MIR and, for simplicity, the MIR in sector
B is normalized at zero. Second, due to limited commitment, agents can borrow only up
to a fraction of the investment return and this fraction depends on financial development.
Third, agents differ in the labor endowment which is continuously distributed.
Given the wage rate and the level of financial development, the agents with the labor
endowment below (equal to or above) a cutoff value cannot (can) meet the MIR in sector
A and are called households (entrepreneurs). Households can save their labor income by
lending to the credit market and investing in sector B, while entrepreneurs have one more
option, i.e., investing in sector A. Thus, if the aggregate investment in sector B turns out
to be positive (zero) in equilibrium, the interest rate must be equal to (higher than) the
rate of return in sector B. Meanwhile, the rate of return in sector A is no less than the
interest rate; otherwise, entrepreneurs would not invest in sector A. Given the level of
financial development and the MIR, the higher the aggregate income, the higher the wage
rate, the higher the agent’s labor income and net wealth, the larger (smaller) the mass
of entrepreneurs (households). Thus, the mass of investors in each sector is endogenous,
depending on aggregate income, financial development, and the MIR.
Let us first consider the model dynamics under autarky. If aggregate income is be-
low a threshold value, the mass of entrepreneurs (households) is so low (high) that the
investment in sector A (B) is less (more) than the efficient level and the rate of return in
sector A is higher than in sector B. Thus, entrepreneurs invest their entire labor income
in sector A and borrow to the limit. The higher aggregate income implies the higher
2Despite the nonconvex individual production set, Matsuyama (2007, 2008) argues that assuming a
continuum of agents convexifies the aggregate production set.
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labor income for individual agents, which affects the sectoral investment through two
channels. First, it allows all agents to invest more so that the sectoral investment tends
to rise in the equal proportions on the intensive margin. Then, the decreasing value
of the marginal product of capital (the neoclassical effect) is a convergence force,
making the law of motion for aggregate income concave. Second, given a constant MIR,
the higher labor income allows more agents to meet the MIR so that the investment
in sector A (B) rises (declines) on the extensive margin and so does the aggregate
credit demand (supply). The change in the cross-sector investment composition
improves the aggregate allocation efficiency, which is a divergence force and makes the
law of motion for aggregate income convex. If the level of financial development is below
a threshold value, the interactions between the cross-sector composition effect and the
neoclassical effect leads to multiple steady states; otherwise, there exists a unique, stable
steady state. In the following, we focus on the parameter configurations that ensures the
unique autarkic steady state.
Consider a world economy where all countries are inherently identical except for the
initial income level. If the cross-sector investment is inefficient in the autarkic steady
state, the price of good A (B) is inefficiently high (low) and so is the rate of return in sector
A (B). The higher aggregate income improves the cross-sector investment composition,
leading to the lower (higher) price of good A (B). Thus, the initially rich (poor) countries
have the comparative advantage in good A (B) and free trade in both final goods allows
them to specialize towards sector A (B) which has the high (low) return. Thus, in the next
period, the aggregate income of the rich (poor) countries is higher (lower) than otherwise
under autarky, which allows even more (less) agents to meet the MIR. Then, the rich
(poor) countries specialize on the extensive margin further in the high-return (low-return)
sector. Changes in the mass of entrepreneurs and in aggregate income reinforce each other
over time. Such a dynamic cycle goes on until the specialization effect is balanced by the
neoclassical effect. The lower the level of financial development or the higher the MIR,
the larger the cross-sector distortion and the rate-of-return differentials, the stronger the
specialization effect, the more likely free trade leads to income divergence.
Matsuyama (2004) embeds financial frictions and fixed investment requirements into
an OLG model. He shows that financial integration may also lead to income divergence
and he calls it symmetry breaking. There is only one final good in his model, which is
freely traded and serves as the vehicle for capital flows. There are two final goods in our
model. If only one good is freely traded, our model replicates Matsuyama’s result.
Intuitively, financial frictions and the sector-specific MIR distort the intratemporal
relative price (the relative final good price) and the intertemporal relative price (the
interest rate). If the extensive-margin effect dominates the neoclassical effect, the two
relative prices rise in aggregate income at the autarkic steady state3. Thus, the rich
(poor) countries have the comparative advantage in the constrained but high-return (un-
constrained but low-return) sector as well as in borrowing (lending). Free trade allows the
rich (poor) countries to specialize in the sector that they have the comparative advantage;
3In Antras and Caballero (2009), the sector-specific financial frictions also distort the two relative
prices. However, in the absence of the extensive-margin effect, the relative final good price is independent
of aggregate income and the interest rate strictly decreases with aggregate income in their model.
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financial integration leads to capital flows from the poor to the rich countries. In both
cases, economic integration may lead to the income divergence rather than convergence
among inherently identical countries. Generally speaking, in the presence with economic
distortions, free mobility of either products or factors may amplify rather than reduce
the distortions, according to the second-best theory (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956).
What if both trade and financial flows are allowed simultaneously? Does it lead to
income convergence? In our model, if both goods are freely traded and the rich countries
do not completely specialize in the constrained sector, adding financial integration on
top of free trade leads to income convergence. This way, moving from the one-sector to
the two-sector setting reduces the likelihood of Matsuyama’s symmetry breaking.4
If free trade does not lead to the complete specialization in the constrained sector
(sector A), the positive investment in the unconstrained sector (sector B) implies the
coupling of the interest rate with the rate of return in the unconstrained sector. By
equalizing the interest rate, financial integration implicitly equalizes the rate of return in
the unconstrained sector. In addition, by equalizing the relative price of sectoral output,
trade integration implicitly equalizes the the rate-of-return ratio of the two sectors. Thus,
allowing both trade and capital flows also equalizes the rate of return in the constrained
sector. Then, the complete factor prices equalization lead to income convergence.
The logic mentioned above explains the income convergence result of Antras and Ca-
ballero (2009). In their model, the mass of investors in each sector is by assumption
exogenous. The investors in the constrained sector borrow up to the limit but they
cannot fully absorb the entire domestic saving. As both sectors have the positive invest-
ment, free trade does not lead to the complete specialization. Since their model always
satisfies the condition highlighted above, their result holds unambiguously.
In our model, the mass of investors in each sector is endogenous. As mentioned
above, the trade-driven specialization creates a dynamic, virtuous cycle between the
aggregate income and the mass of entrepreneurs in the rich countries. If the mass of
entrepreneurs eventually rises to such a high level that entrepreneurs borrow the entire
saving of households, the rich countries specialize completely in sector A and the efficient
aggregate credit demand decouples (couples) the interest rate from (with) the rate of
return in sector B (A). Given the sectoral rate-of-return differential, the interest rate in
the rich countries jumps upwards upon the complete specialization and it can be higher
than in the poor countries. Thus, moving from autarky to free trade does not reverse
the cross-country interest rate differentials and the direction of capital flows.5 Due to
the decoupling, the interest rate equalization under financial integration does not imply
the equalization of the rate of return in sector B and hence, free trade and capital flows
4In Matsuyama (2004), the final good is implicitly freely traded. Thus, the symmetry breaking
actually arises under free mobility of both trade and capital flows.
5In Antras and Caballero (2009), the two countries differ in the level of financial development. In
the autarkic steady state, aggregate income is lower in the less financially developed country and so is
the interest rate, due to the larger cross-sector distortion. Financial integration alone leads to “uphill”
capital flows from the poor to the rich country. Free trade allows the rich (poor) country to specialize
partially in the constrained (unconstrained) sector. Thus, the interest rate is always coupled with the
rate of return in the unconstrained sector, which is higher in the poor than in the rich country. Then,
allowing financial flows on top of free trade leads to “downhill” capital flows from the rich to the poor.
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cannot lead to factor price equalization and income convergence.
1.2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to the literature on trade and income convergence. Deardorff (2001),
Cunat and Maffezzoli (2004b), and Bajona and Kehoe (2010) assume sector-specific factor
intensity and show that trade may prevent inherently identical countries from converging
to the same steady-state income through specialization. Matsuyama (1996) shows that
commodity trade causes the agglomeration of different economic activities in different
regions of the world, leading to income divergence. Matsuyama (2005) introduces sector-
specific borrowing constraints in a static model and shows that free trade allows the rich
(poor) country to specialize in the sector with tighter (looser) borrowing constraints.
Our paper is also related to a recent literature on the joint analysis of intra- and
intertemporal trade. Cunat and Maffezzoli (2004a) embed Heckscher-Ohlin features and
the sector-specific capital intensity in a two-country model and analyze the international
transmission of productivity shocks through trade in goods. Jin (2012) integrates factor-
proportions-based trade and financial capital flows in an OLG model and shows that
capital tends to flow to countries that become more specialized in capital-intensive in-
dustries. Jiao and Wen (2012) embed the Melitz (2003) model into an incomplete-markets
setting and analyze the impacts of financial and non-financial shocks on output and trade
flows. Ju, Shi, and Wei (2014) introduce two tradeable sectors with different factor in-
tensity in a small open economy model and show that the current account adjustment
with respect to exogenous shocks depends on the factor market flexibility.
Our paper focuses on a real friction, i.e., the sector-specific MIR, rather than the
sector-specific factor intensity or the sector-specific financial frictions. In our model, coun-
tries differ only in the initial income level. Given financial frictions and the investment
indivisibility at the individual level, economic integration may lead to the endogenous in-
come divergence. In the real world, countries differ in many other aspects, e.g., economic,
social, and political institutions as well as natural endowments. This way, we propose an
amplification mechanism through which even very small exogenous heterogeneities may
lead to large heterogeneities in endogenous variables.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and ana-
lyzes the distortions of financial frictions and the sector-specific MIR on the cross-sector
investment composition and the relative prices. Sections 3-5 shows that economic inte-
gration may lead to endogenous inequality of nations. Section 6 checks the robustness of
our results under alternative specifications. Section 7 concludes with some final remarks.
The appendix collects the supporting materials and technical proofs.
2 The Model under International Autarky
The world economy consists of a continuum of countries, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Countries
are inherently identical except for the initial income level. In each country, a continuum
of agents indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] are born every period and live for two periods, young and
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old; the population size of each generation is constant at one; agents have the labor en-
dowment when young and consume when old; agent j is endowed with lj =
θ+1
θ
1
j
units of
labor, where j ∈ (1,∞) follows the Pareto distribution with the cumulative distribution
function G(j) = 1− −θj and θ > 1. Agents supply the labor endowment inelastically to
the market and the aggregate labor supply is constant at L =
∫∞
1
ljdG(j) = 1.
In each country, there are two final good sectors, A and B. In period t, sector f ∈
{A,B} employs Ki,ft units of physical capital and Li,ft units of labor to produce Y i,ft units
of final good f . Physical capital fully depreciates after the production. Then, Zi,At units
of final good A and Zi,Bt units of final good B are used as the inputs to produce Y
i
t units
of composite goods.6 The composite good is taken as the numeraire. Old agents consume
Cit units of composite goods and young agents invest M
i,f
t units of composite goods in
period t to produce Ki,ft+1 = RM
i,f
t units of physical capital, which is sector-specific and
becomes available in period t+1. Composite and final goods are tradeable, while physical
capital and labor are not. pi,ft denotes the price of final good f and q
i,f
t denotes the value
of marginal product of capital (VMPK) in sector f . Labor is mobile across sectors and
wit denotes the wage rate. Markets for goods and productive factors are competitive so
that the inputs are rewarded at their respective value of marginal product.
Y i,ft =
(
Ki,ft
α
)α(
Li,ft
1− α
)1−α
, qi,ft K
i,f
t = αp
i,f
t Y
i,f
t , w
i
tL
i,f
t = (1− α)pi,ft Y i,ft , (1)
Y it =
(
Zi,At
η
)η(
Zi,Bt
1− η
)1−η
, pi,At Z
i,A
t = ηY
i
t , p
i,B
t Z
i,B
t = (1− η)Y it , (2)
where α, η ∈ (0, 1). There is no uncertainty in the model economy. The two sectors are
symmetric except for the MIR to be described later.
In this section, we analyze the economic allocation under of international autarky
where trade and capital flows are not allowed. Thus, the goods markets clear domestically
and domestic investment is financed by domestic savings,
Zi,ft = Y
i,f
t and M
i,A
t +M
i,B
t = w
i
t. (3)
Let χit ≡ p
i,B
t
pi,At
and µit ≡ q
i,B
t
qi,At
denote the relative final good price and the sectoral VMPK
ratio, respectively. Combine the linear sectoral capital formation function Ki,ft+1 = RM
i,f
t
with equations (1)-(3) to get the labor input and the investment in the two sectors
Li,At = ηL and L
i,B
t = (1− η)L, (4)
M i,At = ηw
i
t
µit+1
1− η + ηµit+1
and M i,Bt = (1− η)wit
1
1− η + ηµit+1
. (5)
6Under autarky, the market for good f clears domestically, Zi,ft = Y
i,f
t . However, under free trade,
the domestic absorption of final good f can be different from its domestic output, Zi,ft 6= Y i,ft .
Antras and Caballero (2009) assume that physical capital and labor are used to produce two final goods
which can be consumed or invested into physical capital, according to the Cobb-Douglas aggregator. As
a result, agents devote a fraction η of their spending to one good and the rest to the other. Alternatively,
one can introduce a composite good as a Cobb-Douglas aggregator of two final goods, which is then used
for consumption and investment (Ju and Wei, 2011). The two approaches are technically equivalent and
we choose the second approach mainly for the analytical simplicity.
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If the sectoral investment were frictionless, the final good price would equalize in the two
sectors and so would the VMPK, χit = µ
i
t = 1. According to equations (4)-(5), a fraction
η of aggregate labor and savings would be allocated in sector A and the rest in sector B
efficiently.
However, if the investment at the individual level is subject to financial frictions and
the sector-specific MIR, the cross-sector investment may become inefficient. Consider
agent j born in country i and period t. As shown in the left and middle panels of figure
1, the agent can invest in period t mi,Bj,t units of composite goods in sector B and produce
ki,Bj,t+1 = Rm
i,B
j,t units of physical capital, while its investment in sector A must be no less
than a MIR, mi,Aj,t ≥ mit, so as to have the linear output as in sector B, ki,Aj,t+1 = Rmi,Aj,t .
The MIR takes the functional form of mit = m(Y
i
t )
1−σ with m > 0. As shown in the right
panel of figure 1, the MIR is constant for σ = 1, while it is proportional to aggregate
income for σ = 0. Such a function form allows for the possibility that the MIR may differ
in the rich and in the poor country.7
mi,Bj,t
ki,Bj,t+1
O
Rmi,Bj,t
Individual Investment in Sector B
mi,Aj,t
ki,Aj,t+1
O mi
t
Rmi,Aj,t
Individual Investment in Sector A
Yit
m
i
t
m
O
σ=0
σ=1
MIR and Aggregate Income
Figure 1: Individual Investment Function, MIR, and Aggregate Income
Agents have three options to save the labor income nij,t = w
i
tlj: (1) lending to the
credit market for the interest rate rit, (2) investing in sector B for the rate of return q
i,B
t+1R,
and (3) investing in sector A for the rate of return qi,At+1R if they can meet the MIR. Under
autarky, both final goods are produced domestically, i.e., M i,At > 0 and M
i,B
t > 0. As
everyone has the access to option (1) and (2), the interest rate is coupled with the rate
of return in sector B, rit = q
i,B
t+1R. Meanwhile, the interest rate cannot exceed the rate of
return in sector A, rit ≤ qi,At+1R; otherwise, nobody would invest in sector A. To sum up8
rit =q
i,B
t+1R ≤ qi,At+1R. (6)
7It is mainly for the analytical purpose that we allow the MIR to be dependent of aggregate income.
As shown in subsection 2.1, for σ = 0, a change in aggregate income does not affect the mass of
investors in each sector and hence, the sectoral investment adjusts only on the intensive margin. For
σ 6= 0, a change in aggregate income affects the mass of investors in each sector and hence, the sectoral
investment adjusts on the intensive and extensive margins. This way, we can explicitly highlight the role
of the extensive-margin channel by comparing the model results in the two alternative settings. Those
who are uncomfortable with this function form may just take the MIR as a constant, i.e, σ = 1.
8As shown in section 3, free trade may induce the country to specialize completely in sector A and
the zero investment in sector B M i,Bt = 0 implies the decoupling (coupling) of the interest rate from
(with) the rate of return in sector B (A), rit = q
i,A
t+1R ≥ qi,Bt+1R.
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Let us start with the case of rit < q
i,A
t+1R. If agent j can meet the MIR, it prefers to
finance its investment in sector A, mi,Aj,t , with loans. However, due to limited commitment,
it can only borrow up to a fraction λ of the present value of its investment return,
bij,t ≤ λ
qi,At+1Rm
i,A
j,t
rit
, (7)
and has to use its own funds as equity capital to cover the gap mi,Aj,t −bij,t, where λ ∈ (0, 1)
reflects the level of financial development.9 Let ψij,t ≡
mi,Aj,t −bij,t
mi,Aj,t
denote the agent’s equity-
investment ratio in sector A. In period t + 1, it gets the investment return, qi,At+1Rm
i,A
j,t ,
repays the debt, ritb
i
j,t, and consumes the rest. Its equity rate is defined as the rate of
return to equity capital, Ωij,t ≡
qi,At+1Rm
i,A
j,t −ritbij,t
mi,Aj,t −bij,t
. Use the borrowing constraint to get,
ψij,t ≥ 1− λ
qi,At+1R
rit
, (8)
Ωij,t = q
i,A
t+1R + (q
i,A
t+1R− rit)(
1
ψij,t
− 1). (9)
The leverage effect (qi,At+1R−rit)( 1ψij,t −1) depends positively on the spread (q
i,A
t+1R−rit) and
negatively on ψij,t. If r
i
t < q
i,A
t+1R, the positive spread induces the agent to maximize the
leverage effect by minimizing the equity-investment ratio, or equivalently, by borrowing
to the limit so that the equality sign holds for (8) and ψij,t is independent of agent-j’s net
wealth; the positive leverage effect, Ωit > q
i,A
t+1R > r
i
t = q
i,B
t+1R, induces the agent to invest
its entire labor income as equity capital in sector A. If rit = q
i,A
t+1R, the agent does not
borrow to the limit so that its investment size is indeterminate; the inequality sign holds
for (8) and ψij,t is also indeterminate; due to the zero spread, the leverage effect vanishes
and the equity rate is equal to the rate of return in sector A. To sum up,
ψij,t
= ψit ≡ 1− λ
qi,At+1R
rit
, wealth-independent if rit < q
i,A
t+1R;
> 1− λ q
i,A
t+1R
rit
, indeterminate, if rit = q
i,A
t+1R;
(10)
Ωij,t = Ω
i
t =
{
qi,At+1R + (q
i,A
t+1R− rit)( 1ψit − 1) > q
i,A
t+1R > q
i,B
t+1R, if r
i
t < q
i,A
t+1R;
qi,At+1R, if r
i
t = q
i,A
t+1R;
(11)
mi,Aj,t
=
nij,t
ψit
=
wit
ψit
θ+1
θj
, and
∂mi,Aj,t
∂j
< 0, if rit < q
i,A
t+1R;
<
nij,t
ψit
, indeterminate, if rit = q
i,A
t+1R.
(12)
If rit < q
i,A
t+1R, there exists a cutoff value 
i
t. The agents with j ∈ (1, it] can meet the
MIR, mi,Aj,t =
wit
ψit
θ+1
θj
≥ mit and are called entrepreneurs. Their total mass is τ it = 1−(it)−θ.
The cutoff value is determined by the marginal entrepreneur with j = 
i
t,
mi,Aj,t (
i
t) =
wit
ψit
1 + θ
θit
= m(Y it )
1−σ, ⇒ it =
(wit)
σ
ψitF
, where F ≡ θm
(1− α)1−σ(θ + 1) . (13)
9Matsuyama (2008) shows that the strategic default a la` Hart and Moore (1994) can give rise to this
form of the borrowing constraints.
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Young entrepreneurs finance their investment in sector A with the labor income, nij,t, and
the loan bij,t = n
i
j,t(
1
ψit
− 1); when old, they consume, ci,ej,t+1, and exit from the economy,
nij,t = w
i
tlj and c
i,e
j,t+1 = n
i
j,tΩ
i
t. (14)
The agents with j > 
i
t cannot meet the MIR and are called households. Their total mass
is 1 − τ it = (it)−θ. Young households invest mi,Bj,t in sector B and lend the rest of their
labor income nij,t −mi,Bj,t ; when old, they consume, ci,hj,t+1, and exit from the economy,
nij,t = w
i
tlj and c
i,h
j,t+1 = n
i
j,tr
i
t. (15)
The markets for credit, sector-specific physical capital, goods, and labor clear,
Dit ≡
∫ it
1
(mi,Aj,t − nij,t)dG(j), Sit ≡
∫ ∞
it
(nij,t −mi,Bj,t )dG(j), Dit = Sit , (16)
Ki,At+1 =
∫ it
1
Rmi,Aj,t dG(j) = RM
i,A
t , K
i,B
t+1 =
∫ ∞
it
Rmi,Bj,t dG(j) = RM
i,B
t , (17)
Cit ≡
∫ it
1
ci,ej,tdG(j) +
∫ ∞
it
ci,hj,tdG(j), C
i
t +M
i,B
t +M
i,B
t = Y
i
t , (18)
Zi,At = Y
i,A
t , Z
i,B
t = Y
i,B
t , L
i,A
t + L
i,B
t = L. (19)
where Dit and S
i
t denote the aggregate credit demand and supply, respectively.
If rit = q
i,A
t+1R, the agents who can meet the MIR may not invest their entire labor
income in sector A or may not borrow to the limit. Despite the indeterminacy of the
individual investment size, a fraction η of aggregate saving and labor are allocated to
sector A and the rest to sector B.
Definition 1. Under autarky, a market equilibrium in country i is a set of allocations of
agents, {nij,t,mi,fj,t , ci,ej,t, ci,hj,t , ψij,t}, and aggregate variables, {Y it , Y i,ft , Ki,ft ,M i,ft , Li,ft , Zi,ft ,
pi,ft , q
i,f
t , w
i
t, r
i
t,Ω
i
t, 
i
t}, satisfying equations (1)-(2), (6), (10)-(19).
Under autarky, domestic investment is financed by domestic saving in period t, M i,At +
M i,Bt = w
i
t; according to equations (1)-(2), the total investment return in period t+ 1 is∑
f∈{A,B} q
i,f
t+1K
i,f
t+1 = ρw
i
t+1, where ρ ≡ α1−α . The social rate of return is defined as
Υit ≡
∑
f∈{A,B} q
i,f
t+1K
i,f
t+1∑
f∈{A,B}M
i,f
t
=
ηµit+1
1− η + ηµit+1
qi,At+1R +
1− η
1− η + ηµit+1
qi,Bt+1R = ρ
wit+1
wit
. (20)
2.1 Extensive-Margin Effect and Cross-Sector Allocation
Financial frictions and the sector-specific MIR may distort the cross-sector investment,
i.e., aggregate saving is allocated inefficiently less (more) in sector A (B). Thus, the rate
of return in sector A (B) is higher (lower) than the social rate of return and so is the
equity rate (the interest rate), i.e., Ωit > q
i,A
t+1R > Υ
i
t > q
i,B
t+1R = r
i and µit+1 < 1. In this
10
case, the borrowing constraints are binding and the aggregate dynamics of country i are
characterized by {wit, ψit, it, µit+1,Γit,Υit, rit, χit+1} satisfying equations (13), (20)-(24),10
ψit = 1−
λ
µit+1
, (21)
(it)
−(1+θ) = 1− ηµ
i
t+1
1− η + ηµit+1
ψit, (22)
wit+1 =
(
R
ρ
Γitw
i
t
)α
, where Γit ≡
(µit+1)
η
1− η(1− µit+1)
< 1, and
∂Γit
∂µit+1
> 0, (23)
rit = Υ
i
t(1− η + ηµit+1) < Υit, χit+1 = (µit+1)α. (24)
Given the aggregate saving wit, the larger the cross-sector distortion, the lower the
sectoral capital ratio κit+1 ≡ K
i,A
t+1
Ki,Bt+1
=
RM i,At
RM i,Bt
= η
1−ηµ
i
t+1, the lower the sectoral rate-of-
return ratio µit+1 and the sectoral output ratio
Y i,At+1
Y i,Bt+1
= η
1−ηχ
i
t+1 =
η
1−η (µ
i
t+1)
α, the lower
the aggregate output Y it . µ
i
t+1 reflects the cross-sector investment composition and Γ
i
t
measures the aggregate allocation efficiency.
If the allocation is efficient, the model dynamics are characterized by {wit,Υit, rit, χit+1}
satisfying equations (20), (23)-(24) with µit+1 = 1, equations (13) and (22) jointly deter-
mine it and ψ
i
t, and the borrowing constraints (21) are slack with ψ
i
t > 1− λ.11
Define Λ ≡ (1−η+ηλ)
1
1+θ
1−λ (1− α)(1 + 1θ ) as a function of λ ∈ (0, 1) and ∂Λ∂λ > 0.
Lemma 1. Iff m ≤ (Y it )σΛ, the cross-sector investment is efficient, µit+1 = 1, and the
borrowing constraints are slack.
Iff m > (Y it )
σΛ, the cross-sector investment is inefficient, µit+1 ∈ (λ, 1), and the
borrowing constraints are binding. In particular,
∂µit+1
∂λ
> 0,
∂it
∂λ
> 0;
∂µit+1
∂m
< 0,
∂it
∂m
< 0;
sgn
(
∂µit+1
∂Y it
)
= sgn
(
∂it
∂Y it
)
= sgn(σ).
The sectoral rate-of-return ratio µit+1 is affected by four factors, i.e., the level of
financial development λ, the two MIR parameters m and σ, and aggregate income Y it .
Consider the case of m > (Y it )
σΛ. First, the lower the λ, the less the entrepreneur
can borrow against its investment return, the lower its maximum investment, the lower
the cutoff value it, the lower (higher) the mass of entrepreneurs (households), the lower
(higher) the investment in sector A (B) on the intensive and extensive margins, the
larger the cross-sector investment distortion, the lower the µit+1. Second, the larger the
m, the higher the MIR, the lower the cutoff value, the lower (higher) the aggregate
investment in sector A (B) on the extensive margin, the lower the µit+1. Third, the
effects of Y it depends on the sign and the size of σ.
For σ = 0, a rise in Y it raises the MIR, m
i
t = mY
i
t , and the individual’s net wealth,
nij,t = ljw
i
t = lj(1 − α)Y it , in the equal proportions. Thus, the cutoff value it = A is
10See the proofs for lemma 1, 2, and proposition 1 in the appendix for the derivation.
11As mentioned above, the zero spread rit = q
i,A
t+1R leads to the indeterminacy of the investment size and
the equity-investment ratio at the individual level. For analytical simplicity, we focus on an equilibrium
where all entrepreneurs still invest their entire labor income in sector A and choose the same ψit.
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constant, and so are the mass of entrepreneurs, τ it = τA = 1 − −θA , the sectoral rate-of-
return ratio, µit+1 = µA, and the sectoral capital ratio, κ
i
t+1 =
η
1−ηµA, where XA denotes
the steady-state value of variable X it under autarky. In this case, a change in aggregate
income only affects the sectoral investment on the intensive margin, with no impacts
on the extensive margin,
∂it
∂Y it
=
∂µit+1
∂Y it
=
∂Γit
∂Y it
= 0.
For σ > 0, a rise in Y it raises the individual’s net wealth proportionally, while it leads
to a less-than-proportional rise or even a decline in the MISR,
∂ lnmit
∂ lnY it
= 1−σ < ∂ lnnij,t
∂ lnY it
= 1.
Thus, more agents can meet the MIR and invest in sector A. Besides raising the sectoral
investment on the intensive margin, a rise in Y it also improves the cross-sector investment
composition
∂µit+1
∂Y it
> 0 and the aggregate allocation efficiency
∂Γit
∂Y it
> 0 on the extensive
margin. The larger the σ, the stronger the extensive-margin effect.12
To sum up, the extensive margin is the key channel through which the four factors
affect the cross-sector investment composition and the aggregate allocation efficiency. In
particular, σ determines the sign and the size of the extensive-margin effect.
2.2 Extensive-Margin Effect and Multiple Steady States
The higher aggregate income leads to the higher individual’s labor income and saving. For
σ = 0, the sectoral investment responds on the intensive margin and hence, µit+1 = µA;
the sectoral investment ratio and the aggregate allocation efficiency indicator are constant
at
M i,At
M i,Bt
= η
1−ηµA and Γ
i
t = ΓA. Due to the decreasing VMPK (the neoclassical effect),
the law of motion for wage is concave and log-linear with the slope less than unity,13
wit+1 =
(
R
ρ
witΓA
)α
, ⇒ ∂ lnw
i
t+1
∂ lnwit
= α︸︷︷︸
neoclassical effect
< 1. (25)
Proposition 1. Under autarky, there exists a unique, stable steady state for σ = 0, while
there may exist multiple steady states for σ > 0.
For σ > 0, define Y¯A ≡
(
m
Λ
) 1
σ . According to lemma 1, if Y it ≥ Y¯A, the cross-sector
investment is efficient and a rise in Y it raises the investment in two sectors proportionally.
If Y it < Y¯A, the cross-sector investment is inefficient and a rise in Y
i
t raises the sectoral
investment on the intensive margin and improves the cross-sector investment composition
on the extensive margin. The intensive-margin adjustment triggers the neoclassical effect,
which is a convergence force, while the extensive-margin adjustment affects the aggregate
allocation efficiency, which is a divergence force. Use equation (23) to get
∂ lnwit+1
∂ lnwit
= α︸︷︷︸
neoclassical effect
1 + ∂ ln Γit∂ lnµit+1 ∂ lnµ
i
t+1
∂ lnwit︸ ︷︷ ︸
cross-sector composition effect ≥ 0
 . (26)
12For σ < 0, the opposite applies and a rise in Y it worsens the cross-sector investment composition and
the aggregate allocation efficiency. In this paper, we focus on the case of σ ≥ 0.
13Proportional to aggregate income, the wage wit = (1 − α)Y it is a sufficient statistics for Y it in our
model. Thus, we use the law of motion for wage for the dynamic analysis. Alternatively, one can also
use the law of motion for capital but the analysis is technically more complicated.
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Let w¯A ≡ (1 − α)Y¯A. For wit ∈ (0, w¯A), the law of motion for wage in log is non-linear
and multiple steady states may arise, due to the positive cross-sector composition effect.
Figure 2 shows the parameter configuration for multiple steady states in an individual
country in the {λ, ψA} space.14 For the parameter configuration below (above) the diag-
onal line, the cross-sector investment is inefficient (efficient) in the steady state, µA < 1
(µA = 1) and the borrowing constraints are binding with ψA = 1− λµA ∈ (0, 1− λ) (slack
with ψA ∈ [1 − λ, 1]). For the parameter configuration to the left (right) of the vertical
curve, there exist multiple steady states (an unique steady state). Given σ, the diagonal
line and the vertical curve split the {λ, ψA} space into four regions.
ψA
O λ 1
1
SU
BU
SM
BM
σ=5
σ=2
σ=1
Figure 2: Parameter Configuration for Multiple Steady States under Autarky
Let us start with the region above the diagonal line of figure 2 where the borrowing
constraints are s lack in the steady state. The dash-dotted curve in the upper-right panel
of figure 3 shows the benchmark law of motion for wage wit+1 =
(
R
ρ
wit
)α
where the cross-
sector investment is efficient, while the blue solid curve shows the law of motion for wage
with {λ, ψA} in region SU of figure 2. According to lemma 1, for wit > w¯A, the cross-sector
investment is efficient so that only the neoclassical effect is active and the law of motion
for wage is concave, wit+1 =
(
R
ρ
wit
)α
, crossing the 45◦ line once and only once at point
S with wS =
(
R
ρ
)ρ
; for wit ∈ (0, w¯A), the cross-sector investment is inefficient so that,
besides the neoclassical effect, the cross-sector composition effect is also active. The gap
14At first sight, it seems wrong to say that figure 2 shows the parameter configuration, because ψA on
the vertical axis is not a parameter. Instead, one could show the results, for example, in the {λ,R} space
or in the {λ,m} space (Matsuyama, 2004; Zhang, 2013). However, if the results are shown, for example,
in the {λ,R} space, the parameters other than λ and R must be implicitly fixed and it is unclear how
changes in the other parameters may affect the shape of the diagram.
ψit is an endogenous variable. In the autarkic steady state, its value ψA depends on all parameters. given
λ on the horizontal axis, as long as the parameter combinations give the same value of ψA, the shape
of the diagram stays unchanged. One can also map the diagram one-to-one from the {λ, ψA} space into
the {λ,R} space or the {λ,m} space. In addition, as both λ and ψA can be measured empirically, our
results in the {λ, ψA} space can be interpreted meaningfully.
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Figure 3: Phase Diagrams of Wage under Autarky: σ > 0
between the solid and the dash-dotted curves shows the aggregate allocation efficiency
loss due to the cross-sector investment distortion, i.e.,
(
R
ρ
wit
)α
[1− (Γit)α] > 0, for Γit < 1.
According to lemma 1, the lower the λ, the larger the cross-sector distortion and
the efficiency loss. In region SU, the high λ leads to the small cross-sector investment
distortion and the small efficiency loss. As shown in the upper-right panel of figure 3,
for wit ∈ (0, w¯A), the law of motion for wage deviates slightly from its benchmark and
does not intersect with the 45◦ line. Compared to the benchmark case, point S is still
the unique, stable steady state, but the convergence speed to the steady state is slower.
In region SM, the low λ leads to the large cross-sector investment distortion and the
large efficiency loss. As shown in the upper-left panel of figure 3, for wit ∈ (0, w¯A), the law
of motion for wage deviates significantly from its benchmark so that, besides the stable
steady state S with wS =
(
R
ρ
)ρ
, there exist another stable steady state L and an unstable
steady state M. Starting with a low initial income wit < wM , the country converges to
the poverty trap L with a permanently lower income wL < wS.
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Now, consider the region below the diagonal line of figure 2 where the borrowing
constraints are binding in the steady state. According to lemma 1, a higher m leads to
the less efficient cross-sector investment and hence, µit+1 is lower and so is ψ
i
t, according
to equation (21). Let us keep λ constant and move from region SU to BU by raising m.
In region BU, the high λ leads to the small cross-sector investment distortion and the
small efficiency loss. As shown in the lower-right panel of figure 3, the law of motion for
wage deviates slightly from its benchmark so that there exists a unique steady state S
with wS =
(
R
ρ
ΓA
)ρ
and ΓA < 1.
In region BM, the low λ leads to the large efficiency loss. As shown in the lower-left
panel of figure 3, for wit ∈ (0, w¯A), the law of motion for wage deviates significantly from
its benchmark so that there exist multiple steady states, L, S, and H. Starting from a low
(high) income with wit < wS (w
i
t > wS), the country converges to a stable steady state L
(H) with wL < wS (wH > wS). Thus, for the parameter configuration in region SM and
BM, the initial income matters for the convergence path and the long-run allocation.
As shown in subsection 2.1, the higher the σ, the stronger the extensive-margin effect
and the cross-sector composition effect, the more likely the multiple steady states may
arise.15 Thus, the larger the σ, the larger the region SM and BM in figure 2.
In the following sections, we focus on the parameter configurations in regions BU and
SU of figure 2 which ensures the existence of a unique steady state under autarky.
3 Trade Integration and Income Divergence
We first specify the condition under which aggregate income may become a determinant
of comparative advantage in intratemporal trade. Then, we show that free trade induces
countries with different initial incomes to specialize in the sector that they have the
comparative advantage, which may lead to income divergence.
3.1 Extensive-Margin Effect and Comparative Advantage
The larger the cross-sector distortion, the lower the sectoral output ratio,
Y i,At
Y i,Bt
, the higher
(lower) the price of final good A (B), the lower the relative final good price χit = (µ
i
t)
α ≤ 1.
Combine the definition of the relative final good price with equation (2) to get
pi,At = (χ
i
t)
η−1 ≥ 1, and pi,Bt = (χit)η ≤ 1. (27)
For σ = 0, the extensive margin is mute so that µit+1 = µA and χ
i
t+1 = χA = µ
α
A
are constant, independent of aggregate income; for σ > 0 and Y it > Y¯A, the cross-sector
15If η = 1, composite goods are produced one-to-one from final good A and hence, sector B vanishes.
The two-sector model degenerates into a one-sector model and there is no cross-sector investment distor-
tion. Aggregate saving wit is entirely invested in sector A, K
i,A
t+1 = Rw
i
t, and the law of motion for wage
is concave wit+1 =
(
R
ρ w
i
t
)α
. There exists a unique, stable steady state with wA =
(
R
ρ
)ρ
and the initial
income level does not matter for the convergence. Thus, the multiple steady states in the two-sector
model result essentially from the cross-sector investment distortion on the extensive margin.
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investment is efficient so that χit+1 = µ
i
t+1 = 1 are constant, independent of Y
i
t . In these
two cases, χit+1 is identical among all countries, independent of Y
i
t .
For σ > 0 and Y it ∈ (0, Y¯A), the cross-sector investment is inefficient and, according
to lemma 1, aggregate income affects µit+1 and χ
i
t+1 positively on the extensive margin.
Thus, the rich (poor) country has the comparative advantage in sector A (B).
3.2 Trade-Driven Specialization and Multiple Steady States
In period 0, country i announces that two final goods will be freely traded from period 1
onwards.16 As a small open economy, country i takes the world relative final good price
as given, χit = χ
∗ where t = 1, 2, 3, .... Without loss of generality17, we assume χ∗ = χA.
Y i,ft and Z
i,f
t measure the domestic output and absorbtion of good f , respectively.
The export-to-domestic-absorbtion ratio in sector f is ς i,ft ≡ Y
i,f
t −Zi,ft
Zi,ft
, with the negative
value for the case of imports. With no international capital flows, trade is balanced,
pi,At ς
i,A
t Z
i,A
t + p
i,B
t ς
i,B
t Z
i,B
t = 0. Combine it with equation (2) to get
χit
η
1− η =
Zi,At
Zi,Bt
= −χit
ς i,Bt
ς i,At
, ⇒ ς i,Bt = −
η
1− η ς
i,A
t . (28)
If the country specializes completely in sector A (B), it does not produce but imports good
B (A) for the domestic production of composition good, ς i,Bt = −1 (ς i,At = −1). Combine
them with equation (28) to get the range for ς i,At ∈ (−1, 1−ηη ) and ς i,Bt ∈ (−1, η1−η ).
By equalizing the relative final good price, free trade implicitly equalizes the sectoral
rate-of-return ratio; if the borrowing constraints are binding, the equity-investment ratio
is also equalized.
µit = (χ
i
t)
1
α = (χ∗)
1
α = µ∗, (29)
ψit = 1−
λqi,At+1R
rit
= 1− λq
i,A
t+1R
qi,Bt+1R
= 1− λ
µit+1
= 1− λ
µ∗
= ψ∗. (30)
As shown in subsection 3.1, if σ = 0, the relative final good price is identical among
all countries under autarky, χit = χA. Thus, given χ
∗ = χA, free trade does not affect the
dynamics and the steady state of the individual country.
If σ > 0, define wT ≡ (ψ∗F)
1
σ and w¯T ≡
(
µ∗
λ
) 1
σ(1+θ) wT > wT . For w
i
t ∈ (0, wT ],
nobody can meet the MIR so that the country specializes completely in sector B, i.e.,
ς i,At = −1 and ς i,Bt = η1−η . For wit ≥ w¯T , the mass of entrepreneurs is so high that they
borrow the entire saving of households and hence, the country specializes completely in
sector A, i.e., ς i,At =
1−η
η
and ς i,Bt = −1. For wit ∈ (wT , w¯T ), some agents can meet the
MIR and invest in sector A, but their mass is so low that they cannot borrow the entire
saving of households. Thus, both sectors receive the positive investment.
16If free trade is announced and implemented in the same period, the relative final good price is
determined in the world market immediately, which affects the investment return of the currently old
agents and the aggregate income unexpectedly. In the two-period OLG model, announcing free trade
one-period in advance avoids creating the uncertainty.
17Subsection 3.3 endogenizes the relative final good price in a world economy setting.
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Given χit = χ
∗, ψit = ψ
∗, and µit = µ
∗, the aggregate dynamics of country i are
characterized by {wit, it, ς i,At ,Γit} satisfying equations (31)-(33),18
it =

1, if wit ∈ (0, wT ];
(wit)
σ
ψ∗F , if w
i
t ∈ (wT , w¯T );(
µ∗
λ
) 1
1+θ , if wit ≥ w¯T ;
, (31)
ς i,At+1 =

−1, if wit ∈ (0, wT ];
[η(1− µ∗ + µ∗−λ
1−(it)−(1+θ)
)]−1 − 1, if wit ∈ (wT , w¯T );
1−η
η
, if wit ≥ w¯T ;
, (32)
wit+1 =
(
R
ρ
Γitw
i
t
)α
, where Γit ≡
(µ∗)η
1− η(1− µ∗)(1 + ς i,At )
, and
∂Γit
∂ς i,At
> 0. (33)
Figure 4 shows the parameter configuration for multiple steady states under trade
integration in the (λ, ψA) space, given σ = 1 and σ = 0.1, respectively. The solid and the
dash-dotted curves in figure 5 show the law of motion for wage under trade integration
versus under autarky, with the parameter configuration in the five regions of figure 4,
respectively.
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Figure 4: Parameter configuration for Multiple Steady States under Trade Integration
For the parameter configuration in region SU of figure 4, χA = 1. Under trade
integration, χ∗ = χA = 1 implies that the rate of return equalizes in the two sectors,
µit = µ
∗ = (χ∗)
1
α = 1. Thus, the cross-sector allocation of domestic savings are irrelevant
for the aggregate income in the next period. Due to the neoclassical effect, the law of
motion for wage is concave, wit+1 =
(
R
ρ
wit
)α
. See the lower-right panel of figure 5.
18See the proof of Proposition 2 in appendix B for the derivation.
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Figure 5: Phase Diagrams of Wage under Trade Integrations
Proposition 2. Under trade integration, if σ = 0 or if σ > 0 and χ∗ = 1, the autarkic
steady state is still the unique, stable steady state; if σ > 0 and χ∗ < 1, the autarkic
steady state may become unstable and there may exist multiple steady states where the
country specializes partially or completely in one sector.
In the following, we focus on region BU of figure 2 where the borrowing constraints
are binding, µA < 1, and the cross-sector allocation is distorted in the autarkic steady
state, χA = µ
α
A < 1.
Consider first the case of Y i0 > YA. Had the country stayed under autarky, its relative
final good price in period t = 1 would be higher than the steady state level, χi1 > χA.
Given χ∗t = χA < 1 from period t = 1 on, the country has the comparative advantage in
good A, i.e., its autarkic price of final good A (B) in period t = 1 is lower (higher) than
the world level. When the free trade policy is announced in period t = 0, the price of final
good A (B) in period t = 1 is expected to rise (decline) to the world level and so does the
rate of return in sector A (B) in period t = 0, which affects the sectoral investment in two
ways. First, the decline in the rate of return in sector B induces households to invest less
in sector B and to lend more to the credit market, leading to a decline in the interest rate.
The rise in the unit pledgable value λqi,At+1R and the decline in the cost of external funds
rit allow entrepreneurs to borrow more per unit of the investment,
λqi,At+1R
rit
and to invest
more in sector A. Thus, the investment in sector A (B) rises (declines) on the intensive
margin. Second, the decline in the equity-investment ratio ψit = 1− λq
i,A
t+1R
rit
allows more
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agents to meet the MIR and invest in sector A. Thus, the investment in sector A (B)
rises (declines) on the extensive margin.
The cross-sector investment adjustment enables the country to specialize towards
sector A in period t = 0 and to export (import) good A (B) in period t = 1. Given
µ∗ = µA < 1, the rate of return is higher in sector A than in sector B. The country
benefits from specializing in the high-return sector and its period-1 aggregate income is
higher than otherwise under autarky. Then, the higher wage rate in period t = 1 allows
even more agents to meet the MIR and invest in sector A so that the country specializes
even further towards the high-return sector. This way, free trade triggers the dynamic,
virtuous cycles in the rich countries, through which the rising mass of entrepreneurs and
the rising aggregate income reinforcing each other over time through specialization. The
dynamic reinforcing process goes on until the the mass of entrepreneurs eventually rises
to such a high level that entrepreneurs borrow the entire saving of households. In that
case, the country specializes completely in sector A and any further rise in the mass of
entrepreneurs will not improve the cross-sector investment and the allocation efficiency.
By the same logic, if Y i0 < YA, the country has a comparative advantage in sector B
and, due to the trade-driven specialization towards the low-return sector (sector B) in
period t = 0, its aggregate income in period t = 1 is lower than otherwise under autarky,
which leads to a even lower mass of entrepreneurs and the specialization further towards
the low-return sector in period t = 1. This way, free trade triggers the dynamic, vicious
cycles in the poor countries, through which the declining mass of entrepreneurs and the
declining aggregate income reinforcing each other over time. The dynamic reinforcing
process goes on until the the mass of entrepreneurs eventually declines to zero. In that
case, the country specializes completely in sector B and any further decline in aggre-
gate income does not worsen the cross-sector investment and the allocation efficiency.
Overall, the trade-driven specialization is a divergence force, making the law of
motion for aggregate income steeper around the autarkic steady state. It interacts with
the neoclassical effect, which determines the dynamic stability property.
The lower the level of financial development λ or the larger the m or the σ, the larger
the cross-sector investment distortion, the larger the cross-sector difference in the final
good prices, the stronger the specialization effect, the more likely trade integration may
destabilize the autarkic steady state and lead to multiple steady states.
Given the level of financial development, there exist three threshold values,
• ψ˜T ≡ 1− λ1−η
[(
1−η
λ
+ η
) 1
σρ(1+θ)+1 − η
]
,
• ψˆT = (1− λ)
[
1− 1
σρ(1+θ)( 1−η
λ
+η)+1
]
, and
• ψ¯T = 1− ηλ
[1−η+ηλ]
1
σρ(1+θ)+1−(1−η)
,
which split region BU of figure 2 into four subregions of figure 4.
• For ψA ∈ (0, ψ˜T ), the parameter configurations are in region B2. Given the level
of financial development, the high MIR leads to the severe cross-sector distortion
under autarky so that the cross-sector rate-of-return differential is large. Thus,
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the trade-driven specialization effect is strong enough to dominate the neoclassical
effect in the autarkic steady state. As shown in the upper-left panel of figure 5, the
autarkic steady state becomes unstable and, for wi0 > wS (w
i
0 < wS), the country
converges to a new steady state H (L) where it specializes completely in sector A
(B) with the income higher (lower) than in the autarkic steady state.
• For ψA ∈ (ψ˜T , ψˆT ), the parameter configurations are in region B1. Compared
with case B2, the lower m leads to a smaller cross-sector distortion and hence,
the specialization effect is weaker. Although trade integration still destabilizes the
autarkic steady state, the aggregate dynamics differ slightly from case B2. As shown
in the upper-middle panel of figure 5, for wi0 > wS, the country converges to a new
steady state H with wH > wS where it partially specializes in sector A, wH < w¯T .
• For ψA ∈ (ψˆT , ψ¯T ), the parameter configurations are in region AB. With an even
lower MIR, the specialization effect is weaker than in case B1. Free trade does
not destabilize the autarkic steady state but it generates the other two steady
states, M and L. As shown in the upper-right panel of figure 5, for wi0 < wM , the
country converges to a new steady state L where it specializes completely in sector
B; otherwise, it converges to the autarkic steady state.
• For ψA ∈ (ψ¯T , 1 − λ), the parameter configurations are in region A. The special-
ization effect is so weak that free trade does not lead to multiple steady states.
However, As shown in the lower-left panel of figure 5, the convergence is slower.
To sum up, the extensive margin is the key channel through which aggregate income
may become a determinant of comparative advantage. Free trade affects the mass of
investors in each sector and triggers the sectoral investment adjustment on the extensive
margin, which may lead to specialization and multiple steady states.19
As shown in subsections 2.1 and 2.2, σ affects the size of the extensive-margin effect.
Compare the two panels of figure 4. The larger the σ, the larger the cross-sector distortion
under autarky, the larger the cross-sector difference in the final good prices, the stronger
the specialization effect, the more likely free trade may lead to multiple steady states,
and hence, the larger the region B2-B1-AB.
So far, we have taken the world relative final good price as given at χ∗ = χA and
analyzed the impacts of trade integration for a small open economy. The model helps
explain why countries which are inherently identical except for the initial income may
possibly converge to different steady states, but it does not tell whether this is inevitable.
In subsection 3.3, we endogenize χ∗ in a world economy model and show the condition
under which trade integration inevitably leads to income divergence.
19In Antras and Caballero (2009), the mass of investors in each sector is exogenous and hence, the
extensive margin is inactive. In our model, for σ = 0, the mass of investors in each sector is endogenous
but constant under autarky so that the extensive margin is also inactive. If the cross-country difference
in financial development is then introduced into our setting with σ = 0, our model becomes analytically
equivalent to theirs. In both models, free trade affects the sectoral investment only on the intensive
margin so that it cannot lead to the complete specialization and multiple steady states.
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3.3 Income Divergence in A World Economy
As shown in subsection 2.2, an individual country converges to a unique, stable steady
state under autarky with the aggregate income at YA, if the parameter configurations are
in region SU and BU of figure 2. As a collection of autarkic countries, the world economy
has a unique, stable steady state which is symmetric, i.e., all countries end up with the
same income level YA in the long run.
In the case of trade integration, the two final goods are traded globally at the relative
price χ∗t and the markets clear at the world level. Although the symmetric steady state
mentioned above is still a steady state for the world economy, it may not be stable and
there may exist stable, asymmetric steady states where the world economy is polarized
into two groups of countries with the different incomes in the long run.
The Symmetric Steady State
For the parameter configuration in region SU-A-AB of figure 4, trade integration does
not destabilize the autarkic steady state for the small open economy so that the world
economy has a stable, symmetric steady state where all countries end up with the same
steady-state income as under autarky; for the parameter configuration in region B1-B2,
trade integration destabilizes the autarkic steady state for a small open economy so that
the world economy does not have the stable, symmetric steady state.
The Asymmetric Steady States
According to figure 5, in the cases of multiple steady states, if a country ends up in the
steady state L, it specializes completely in sector B with wL =
[
R
ρ
(µ∗)η
]ρ
and import
ηYL
pA,∗ units of good A; if it ends up in the steady state H, it may specialize completely or
partially in sector A with wH =
[
R
ρ
(µ∗)η
1−η(1−µ∗)(1+ςAH)
]ρ
and export ςAH
ηYH
pA,∗ units of good A.
Suppose that the world economy is in a stable, asymmetric steady state where the fraction
δ of countries have the steady-state income YL and the rest have YH . χ
∗ is determined
by the market clearing condition for final good A at the world level,20
δ
ηYL
pA,∗
= (1− δ)ςAH
ηYH
pA,∗
, ⇒ δ = ς
A
H
ςAH + [1− η(1− µ∗)(1 + ςAH)]ρ
(34)
Thus, there exists a δ that supports the world relative final good price χ∗ = (µ∗)α.
According figure 4, ψ¯T is the threshold value for the border between the region with
multiple steady states (B2-B1-AB) and the region with unique steady states (A-SU), given
χ∗ = χA. As there always exists a δ that supports χ∗ = χA, an asymmetric steady state
exists for the parameter configurations in region B2-B1-AB, i.e., ψA ∈ (0, ψ¯T ). Besides,
given ψA ∈ (0, ψ¯T ), there exists a continuum of χ∗ in the neighborhood of χA such that,
for each χ∗, the world economy has a stable asymmetric steady state. Furthermore,
20Given the balanced trade at the country level, if the market for one final good clears at the world
level, the market for the other one must also clear, according to the Walras’ law. Thus, we only need to
analyze the market clearing condition for one final good.
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Figure 6: Parameter Configuration for Symmetry Breaking under Trade Integration
without the restriction of χ∗ = χA, there may exist asymmetric steady states even for
parameter configurations in region A, i.e., ψA > ψ¯T .
Proposition 3. Given the level of financial development, if the MIR is sufficiently high
so that ψA < ψ¯
SB
T , the world economy has a continuum of stable, asymmetric steady states
under trade integration where a fraction δ ∈ (δ−, δ+) ⊂ (0, 1) of the countries have the
income YL < YA and the rest have the income YH > YA.
The solid (dashed) curves in figure 6 shows ψ¯SBT (ψ¯T ) in the {λ, ψA} space for σ ∈
{1, 0.1}. Intuitively, if we do not impose the restriction of χ∗ = χA, it is more likely that
trade integration may lead to multiple steady states for the individual country and the
asymmetric steady states for the world economy, i.e., ψ¯SBT > ψ¯T .
If the asymmetric steady state is stable, free trade leads to income divergence rather
than convergence among inherently identical countries. Thus, the world economy is
inevitably polarized into the rich and the poor. This way, we offer a theoretical support
for the view that international trade is a mechanism through which rich countries become
richer at the expense of poor countries.
4 Financial Integration and Income Divergence
Under autarky, due to financial frictions and the sector-specific MIR, the mass of en-
trepreneurs (households) is inefficiently low (high) and so is the aggregate credit demand
(supply). Thus, the interest rate is below the social rate of return, as shown in equation
(24). The higher aggregate income raises the sectoral investment on the intensive margin.
The neoclassical effect tends to reduce the social rate of return and the interest rate.
If σ > 0, the higher aggregate income also allows more agents to become entrepreneurs
and the aggregate credit demand (supply) rises (declines) on the extensive margin,
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which tends to raise the interest rate. If the extensive-margin effect dominates the neo-
classical effect, the interest rate rises in aggregate income under autarky. Thus, the
interest rate is higher in the rich than in the poor countries. Free capital mobility leads
to capital flows from the poor to the rich countries, which directly raises (reduces) the
size and indirectly improves (worsens) the composition of the aggregate investment in the
rich (poor) on the extensive margin. Thus, financial integration may lead to income
divergence. If σ = 0, the extensive margin is inactive. Due to the neoclassical effect, the
interest rate is lower in the rich than in the poor and free capital mobility leads to capital
flows from the rich to the poor countries, which narrows the cross-country income gaps
and leads to income convergence.
Similar as in the case of trade integration, the extensive margin is the key channel
through which aggregate income may become a determinant of “comparative advantage”
in the intratemporal trade. Furthermore, it is also through the extensive margin that
free capital mobility may affect the allocation efficiency and lead to income divergence.
As the analysis is similar as that of trade integration, we leave it in appendix A.
5 Trade and Financial Integration
Sections 3 and 4 have shown that, in the case of σ > 0, either trade or financial integration
may lead to income divergence. Can trade and financial integration jointly lead to income
convergence, as argued in Antras and Caballero (2009)?
5.1 Interest Rate Patterns under Trade Integration
Under trade integration, domestic investment in period t is funded by domestic saving,
M i,At +M
i,B
t = w
i
t, and the investment revenue in period t+1 is q
i,A
t+1RM
i,A
t +q
i,B
t+1RM
i,B
t =
ρwit+1. Thus, the social rate of return is Υ
i
t =
ρwit+1
wit
. Combine it with equations (31)-(33)
to get the interest rate as a piecewise function of aggregate income over three intervals.
1.) For wit ∈ (0, wT ], no one meets the MIR in sector A and the country specializes
completely in sector B. As all agents invest in sector B with the same linear technology,
the (underlying) interest rate is equal to the social rate of return,
ln rit = lnRq
i,B
t+1 = ln Υ
i
t = −(1− α) lnwit + ln ρ1−αRα + αη lnµ∗t+1. (35)
2.) For wit ∈ (wT , w¯T ), some agents meet the MIR and invest in sector A as entrepreneurs,
ς i,At ∈ (−1, 1−ηη ). If µ∗t+1 < 1, entrepreneurs borrow to the limit but their mass is ineffi-
ciently low and so is the aggregate credit demand. Thus, the interest rate is below the
social rate of return.
ln rit = lnRq
i,B
t+1 = ln Υ
i
t[1− η(1− µ∗t+1)(1 + ς i,At )] < ln Υit,
ln rit = −(1− α) lnwit
[ 1
µ∗t+1
− 1
ψ∗t
(
1− (ψ
∗
tF)
1+θ
(wit)
σ(1+θ)
)
+ 1
]
+ ln ρ1−αRα + αη lnµ∗t+1. (36)
3.) For wit > w¯T , the mass of entrepreneurs is so high that they borrow the entire saving
of households. Thus, the country specializes completely in sector A and the aggregate
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credit demand is so high that the interest rate is equal to the social rate of return,
ln rit = lnRq
i,A
t+1 = ln Υ
i
t = −(1− α) lnwit + ln ρ1−αRα + αη lnµ∗t+1 − α lnµ∗t+1. (37)
According to equations (35)-(37),
∂rit
∂wit
< 0 within each interval, mainly due to the neoclas-
sical effect. For wit ∈ (0, w¯T ), the positive investment in sector B implies the coupling
of the interest rate with the rate of return in sector B, rit = Rq
i,B
t+1, according to equa-
tion (6); for wit > w¯T , the complete specialization in sector A fundamentally changes
the credit market condition, which decouples (couples) the interest rate from (with)
the rate of return in sector B (A), rit = Rq
i,A
t+1. If µ
∗
t+1 < 1, the sectoral rate-of-return
differential Rqi,At+1 > Rq
i,B
t+1 implies an upward jump in the interest rate upon the complete
specialization at wit = w¯T ; if µ
∗
t+1 = 1, Rq
i,A
t+1 = Rq
i,B
t+1 so that the interest rate pattern is
continuous at wit = w¯T .
Figure 7 shows the interest rate patterns under free trade in the five cases of figure
5, with the wage in log on the horizontal axis. The red solid (blue dash-dotted) curve
shows the interest rate (the social rate of return) in log. In case SU, µ∗ = µA = 1
and hence, the interest rate is continuous and equal to the social rate of return. In
other cases, µ∗ = µA < 1 and hence, the interest rate jumps upwards at wit = w¯T . For
wit ∈ (0, wT ) ∪ (w¯T ,∞), the complete specialization implies rit = Υit; for wit ∈ (wT , w¯T ),
both sectors are active and rit < Υ
i
t. In the steady state, w
i
t+1 = w
i
t so that Υ
i
t = ρ.
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Figure 7: Interest Rate Patterns under Trade Integrations
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5.2 Factor Price Equalization and Income Convergence
Consider the parameter configurations in region B1 of figure 4. Under trade integration,
the world economy may end up in the asymmetric steady states where the poor (rich)
countries specialize completely (partially) in sector B (A). According to equations (35)-
(36) and the upper-middle panels of figure 5 and 7, the poor end up at point L with
rit = Υ
i
t = ρ and the rich at point H with r
i
t < Υ
i
t = ρ.
In the asymmetric steady state, since sector B has a positive investment in all coun-
tries, the interest rate is coupled with the rate of return in sector B in all countries,
rit = q
i,B
t+1R, which is lower in the rich than in the poor. If financial integration is allowed,
financial capital flows from the rich to the poor, which equalizes directly the interest rate
rit = r
∗
t and indirectly the VMPK in sector B, q
i,B
t+1 =
rit
R
=
r∗t
R
= q∗,Bt+1. Given that trade
integration has already equalized the sectoral rate-of-return ratio µit+1 = µ
∗
t+1, allowing
financial integration also equalizes the VMPK in sector A, qi,At+1 =
qi,Bt+1
µit+1
=
q∗,Bt+1
µ∗t+1
= q∗,At+1.
Thus, although labor is internationally immobile, free mobility of goods and financial
capital equalizes the wage rate and aggregate income,
wit+1 = [(q
i,A
t+1)
η(qi,Bt+1)
1−η]−ρ = [(q∗,At+1)
η(q∗,Bt+1)
1−η]−ρ = w∗t+1, Y
i
t+1 =
wit+1
1− α =
w∗t+1
1− α = Y
∗
t+1.
In this case, the world economy behaves like a large autarkic economy and there exists
a unique, symmetric steady state where all countries have the same income as under
autarky. This result also holds for the parameter configuration in region AB of figure 4.
In Matsuyama (2004), there is only one final good, which serves as the vehicle for
capital flows and is freely traded. Thus, symmetry breaking arises in a one-sector model
with free mobility of trade and capital flows. Here, we show that moving from the one-
sector to the two-sector setting may reduce the likelihood of symmetry breaking.21
However, allowing free trade and capital flows does not necessarily eliminate symmetry
breaking. For the parameter configurations in region B2 of figure 4, trade integration
induces the world economy to end up in the asymmetric steady states where the rich
(poor) specialize completely in sector A (B). According to equations (35) and (37) as
well as the upper-left panels of figure 5 and 7, the rich (poor) end up at point H (L) with
rit = Υ
i
t = ρ. Since the rich and the poor countries have the same interest rate in the
asymmetric steady state under trade integration, adding financial integration does not
create any capital flows and the income gap between the rich and the poor still exists.
The intuition has been explained in subsection 1.1. In Antras and Caballero (2009),
the exogenous mass of investors in each sector allows the sectoral investment to adjust
only on the intensive margin so that trade integration does not lead to the complete
specialization. Thus, free mobility of trade and capital flows unambiguously leads to
income convergence. In our model, the endogenous mass of investors in each sector
allows the sectoral investment to adjust also on the extensive margin so that free trade
21Our result holds for a sufficiently large sectoral heterogeneity in the MIR. As shown in subsection
6.1, if the sectoral heterogeneity in the MIR is small enough, the two-sector model behaves analytically
identical as the one-sector model around the autarkic steady state so that moving from the one-sector
to the two-sector setting does not affect Matsuyama’s symmetry breaking.
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may lead to the complete specialization. Thus, free mobility of trade and capital flows
may lead to income convergence only conditionally.
6 Robustness Check and Extensions
Many assumptions are made in our model for tractability. In this section, we check the
robustness of our model results by reconsidering some alternative assumptions.
6.1 Sector-Specific MIR
For simplicity, we normalize the MIR in sector B at zero. In the presence of financial
frictions, the positive MIR in sector A becomes an entry barrier and, given the zero MIR
in sector B, those who cannot meet the MIR in sector A still can freely invest in sector
B and lend to the credit market. Thus, the MIR in sector A distorts the allocation in
two dimensions. First, it distorts the intratemporal relative price (the relative final good
price) through affecting the cross-sector investment composition, as shown in subsection
3.1; second, it distorts the intertemporal relative price (the interest rate) through affecting
the credit market equilibrium, as shown in appendix A.1.
We can decompose the distortions in these two dimensions by allowing for a positive
MIR in sector B. Consider the case of the constant MIR, i.e., σ = 1. Let m and γm
denote the MIR in sector A and in sector B, respectively, where γ ∈ [0, 1] measures the
sectoral MIR ratio. For γ = 0, the model is the one we have analyzed so far.
For γ = 1, the two sectors are subject to the same real friction m and the same
financial frictions λ so that the cross-sector investment is efficient in equilibrium and the
intratemporal relative price is constant at unity, χit+1 = 1.
22 The agents who cannot
meet the MIR can only lend their savings to the credit market. Given λ < 1, the higher
the m, the lower (higher) the mass of agents who can (cannot) invest in the two sectors,
the lower (higher) the aggregate credit demand (supply), the larger the deviation of the
interest rate from the social rate of return.
We can extend the analysis to the intermediate case of γ ∈ (0, 1). Given a sufficiently
high m, the lower the γ, the larger the sectoral heterogeneity and the cross-sector invest-
ment distortion, the lower the relative final good price, the more likely free trade may
lead to income divergence. Given the sectoral MIR ratio γ, the higher the m, the smaller
the mass of agents who can meet the MIR, the less (more) the borrowers (lenders) on the
credit market, the larger the interest rate distortion. Thus, the size of the MIR m is a
key determinant for the intertemporal distortion, while the sectoral MIR ratio γ is a key
determinant for the intratemporal distortion.
6.2 Sector-Specific Financial Frictions
In our model, an entrepreneurs can borrow against a fraction λ ∈ [0, 1] of its future
investment revenue. Generally speaking, this fraction depends on the institutional factors
22In this case, the model is equivalent to a one-sector model, which is analyzed in Zhang (2013).
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(i.e, the legal enforcement, the sophistication of financial markets, the liquidity of asset
markets, etc.), the sector-specific factors (e.g., the project tangibility and liquidity), and
the individual-specific factors (e.g., the borrower’s credit record).
In our current setting, both sectors are subject to the same λ23, which reflects the
institution-related factors. In so doing, we can focus on the sectoral heterogeneity in a real
friction, i.e., the MIR. Alternatively, one can assume that both sectors are subject to the
same MIR and introduce the sectoral heterogeneity in the financial frictions by assigning
λf ∈ [0, 1] to sector f ∈ {A,B},24 which does not affect our results. However, with λf
reflecting both the institution- and the sector-related factors, one cannot decompose the
implications of the financial frictions from these two sources.
Zhang (2013a) models explicitly the sector-specific project tangibility, rather than
conveniently capturing it with the sector-specific λf . Suppose that the individual’s project
investment in sector f ∈ {A,B}, mft , consists of the tangibles, mf,Tt , which determines
the project scale, and the intangibles, mf,It , which determines the project productivity,
i.e., mft = m
f,T
t +m
f,I
t and k
f
t+1 = m
f,T
t R($
f
t ), where $
f
t ≡ m
f,I
t
mf,Tt
denotes the intangibles-
tangibles ratio with R(0) = 1, R′ > 0 and R′′ < 0. Upon default, the intangibles are
completely lost and the tangibles have the liquidation value λqft+1m
f,T
t , where λ measures
the institutional factors and applies equally to both sectors. Thus, the agents can borrow
less per unit of total investment in the sector with a higher intangible-tangible ratio. This
way, one can analyze the implications of the sector-specific factors that affects the firm’s
external financing in a more micro-founded way.
6.3 Sector-Specific Capital Intensity
A recent literature analyzes the implications of the sector-specific capital intensity on
trade flows (Bajona and Kehoe, 2010; Cunat and Maffezzoli, 2004b; Deardorff, 2001;
Jin, 2012; Ju, Shi, and Wei, 2014; Ju and Wei, 2009, 2011). In our current setting, the
two sectors have the same capital share, α. Under autarky, the capital-labor ratio is
endogenous and lower in the more financially constrained sector; under trade integration,
the rich (poor) country exports the labor-intensive (capital-intensive) goods. Antras and
Caballero (2009) get the similar result and argue that credit constraints may provide
an explanation for the so-called Leontief paradox. see Wynne (2005) for more on this.
Ju and Wei (2011) introduce the exogenous, sector-specific capital-labor ratio and fixed
costs in a static Heckscher-Ohlin model with the financial frictions. They show that the
capital intensive sector can become more financially dependent. Following Acemoglu and
Guerrieri (2008) and Jin (2012), we can introduce the sector-specific capital share in our
current setting25 and show that the capital intensity can be higher or lower in the more
23Given the zero MIR in sector B, the agents who cannot invest in sector A, i.e., households, can freely
invest in sector B and lend to the credit market. In equilibrium, rt ≥ qi,Bt+1R; otherwise, no agents would
lend. Thus, households do not strictly prefer borrowing and hence, financial frictions in sector B are
irrelevant. As shown in subsection 6.1, if the MIR in sector B is also positive, the financial frictions in
sector B matters for the equilibrium allocation.
24Following Antras and Caballero (2009), one may assume that the financial contracting in sector B
is perfect, i.e., λB = 1, while there is a financial friction in sector A, λA < 1.
25Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) find a huge dispersion of the average capital share among 22 sectors.
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financially constrained sector.
Consider the case of the constant MIR, σ = 1. Let αf denote the capital share in
sector f ∈ {A,B}. For αA = αB, the model is the one we have analyzed so far. For
αA 6= αB, define some auxiliary parameters η˜ ≡ αAη
αAη+αB(1−η) , α˜ ≡ αAη + αB(1 − η),
and ρ˜ ≡ α˜
1−α˜ . Under autarky, the law of motion for wage is wt+1 =
(
R
ρ˜
wtΓt
)α˜
with
Γt ≡ η˜µt+11−η˜(1−µt+1) , which are analytically identical as equation (23).
Let kft ≡ K
f
t
Lft
denote the capital-labor ratio in sector f . Let ρf ≡ αf
1−αf . The sec-
toral capital-intensity ratio
kAt+1
kBt+1
= ρ
A
ρB
µt+1 depends on two factors, i.e., the cross-sector
difference in the capital share, ρ
A
ρB
, and the cross-sector investment distortion, µt+1. In
our current setting, αA = αB = α and hence, the sectoral capital intensity ratio depends
only on the cross-sector investment distortion,
kAt+1
kBt+1
= µt+1. In the frictionless case, the
cross-sector investment is efficient, µt+1 = 1, and the sectoral capital intensity equalizes,
kAt+1 = k
B
t+1; in the frictional case, the cross-sector investment is inefficient, µt+1 < 1, and
the sectoral capital intensity lower in the more financially constrained sector, kAt+1 < k
B
t+1,
due to the under- (over-) investment in sector A (B).
Suppose that sector A not only has a higher MIR but also a higher capital share than
sector B, αA > αB. In the frictionless case, µt+1 = 1, so that the capital intensity is
strictly higher in the sector with a higher capital share, kAt+1 =
ρA
ρB
kBt+1 > k
B
t+1. In the
frictional case, µt+1 < 1. If the cross-sector distortion dominates (is dominated by) the
cross-sector difference in the capital share, the capital intensity is lower (higher) in the
more financially constrained sector under autarky.
7 Final Remarks
The main message of this paper is to highlight the extensive margin as a critical channel
through which aggregate income may become a determinant of comparative advantage,
given financial frictions and the sectoral heterogeneity in the MIR. It is also through the
extensive margin channel that free trade may allow the initially rich (poor) countries to
specialize completely in the high-MIR (low-MIR) sector. Given the sectoral rate-of-return
differentials, the trade-driven specialization effect interacts with the neoclassical effect,
which may lead to income divergence among inherently identical countries. Financial
integration may also lead to income divergence through the extensive-margin channel.
If free trade allows the rich countries to specialize completely in the high-MIR sec-
tor, the credit market condition changes fundamentally and the interest rate in the rich
countries jumps upward, which can be higher than in the poor countries. Thus, moving
from autarky to free trade does not necessarily reverse the direct of capital flows across
countries and free mobility of trade and capital flows does not necessarily lead to income
convergence. Here, the extensive-margin channel plays a critical role in explaining these
results. This way, we complement the results of Antras and Caballero (2009) and refine
the condition for the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.
Our model has two policy implications. First, the countries with a high level of fi-
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nancial development and/or aggregate income (e.g., developed countries) benefit from
economic integration in terms of the long-run income level and/or the convergence speed.
Second, the countries with the moderately low level of financial development and/or ag-
gregate income (e.g., middle-income countries) should be cautious of the timing for trade
or capital account liberalization as well as the partners with whom they are integrated.
Policies aiming at improving domestic financial institutions are more relevant than those
simply aiming at reducing the barriers to trade or financial transactions.
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Appendix
A Financial Integration and Income Divergence
Similar as in section 3, we show that financial integration may lead to income divergence
among inherently identical countries. We first derive the condition under which aggregate
income may become a determinant of “comparative advantage” for intertemporal trade,
i.e., borrowing or lending. Then, we show that, under financial integration, capital may
flow from the poor to the rich, widening the initial income gap.
A.1 Extensive-Margin Effect and Comparative Advantage
Financial frictions and the sector-specific MIR may distort the interest rate. For nota-
tional simplicity, we suppress the country index.
In the case of the efficient cross-sector investment µt+1 = 1, the interest rate coincides
with the social rate of return. According to equations (20) and (23)-(24), the higher the
aggregate income, the higher the aggregate saving and investment, the lower the social
rate of return and the interest rate, due to the neoclassical effect.
In the case of the inefficient cross-sector investment µt+1 < 1, the borrowing con-
straints are binding so that, due to the inefficiently low aggregate credit demand, the
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interest rate is below the social rate of return. Combining the binding borrowing con-
straints with equations (5), (16), and (22), the aggregate credit demand and supply are,
Dt =λ
qAt+1R
rt
MAt = λ
qAt+1R
rt
wt
[
1− (1− τt)(1+ 1θ ) 1− η
1− η + ηλ
]
,
∂Dt
∂rt
< 0, (38)
lnDt = lnwt︸︷︷︸
net-wealth effect
+ ln
[
1− (1− τt)(1+ 1θ ) 1− η
1− η + ηλ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
demand-side extensive-margin effect
+ ln qAt+1R︸ ︷︷ ︸
neoclassical effect
+ lnλ︸︷︷︸
financial-development effect
− ln rt︸︷︷︸
interest-rate effect
(39)
St =wt
−(1+θ)
t −M i,Bt = wt
[
(1− τt)(1+ 1θ ) − 1− η
1− η + η rt
qAt+1R
]
,
∂St
∂rt
> 0, (40)
lnSt = lnwt︸︷︷︸
net-wealth effect
+ ln
 (1− τt)(1+ 1θ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
supply-side extensive-margin effect
− 1− η
1− η + ηµt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
alternative investment effect
 . (41)
According to equation (38), a rise in the interest rate reduces the present value of the
entrepreneurs’ pledgeable investment return so that the credit demand curve is downward
sloping; according to equation (40), a rise in the interest rate induces households to cut
their investment in sector B and lend more so that the credit supply curve is upward
sloping. As shown in equations (39) and (41), the credit demand and the credit supply
are also affected by the following factors.
• The net-wealth effect: the higher the aggregate income, the higher the agents’ labor
income and net wealth, the higher the credit demand and the credit supply.
• The extensive-margin effect: the larger the mass of entrepreneurs τt, the smaller
the mass of households 1− τt, the higher (lower) the credit demand (supply).
• The neoclassical effect: the higher the aggregate investment in sector A in period
t, the lower the VMPK in sector A in period t + 1, the lower the pledgeable value
of the individual entrepreneur’s investment return, the lower the credit demand.
• The financial-development effect: the higher the level of financial development, the
more the individual entrepreneur can borrow, the higher the credit demand.
• The alternative-investment effect: the more the households invest in sector B, the
lower the credit supply.
Figure 8 shows the credit market equilibrium under autarky. Consider the case of the
inefficient cross-sector investment. The downward-sloping credit demand curve Dt and
the upward-sloping credit supply curve St cross at point E with the equilibrium interest
rate at rt. If aggregate income rises marginally from Yt to Y˜t, the aggregate saving rises
proportionally from wt = (1− α)Yt to w˜t = (1− α)Y˜t. Define ∆ lnXt ≡ ln X˜t − lnXt as
the percentage change in variable Xt.
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Figure 8: Interest Rate Response to An Increase in Aggregate Income
If σ = 0, the extensive margin is mute µt+1 = µA so that higher Yt raises the sectoral
investment only on the intensive margin, without affecting the mass of entrepreneurs
τt = τA. According to equations (39) and (41), the positive net-wealth effect raises
the credit supply and demand in the equal proportions, while the neoclassical effect
(the decreasing VMPK) reduces the credit demand. With the net wealth effect exactly
canceling out on both sides, the interest rate is purely driven by the neoclassical effect,
∆ lnDt = ∆ lnwt + ∆ ln q
A
t+1R−∆ ln rt, ∆ lnSt = ∆ lnwt,
∆ lnDt = ∆ lnSt, ⇒, ∆ ln rt = ∆ ln qAt+1R︸ ︷︷ ︸
the neoclassical effect (-)
. (42)
As shown in the left panel of figure 8, the rightward shift of the credit demand curve is
dominated by that of the credit supply curve and hence, the credit market equilibrium
moves from point E to E˜ with a lower interest rate r˜t < rt.
If σ > 0, higher Yt affects the sectoral investment on the intensive and the extensive
margins. In particular, the extensive-margin effect raises (reduces) the credit demand
(supply). As shown in the right panel of figure 8, the rightward shift of the credit demand
(supply) curve is larger (smaller) than in the case of σ = 0. Combining equations (39)
and (41), the interest rate is affected by four factors in the case of σ > 0,
∆ ln rt = ∆ ln q
A
t+1R︸ ︷︷ ︸
neoclassical effect (-)
+ ∆ ln
[
1− (1− τt)(1+ 1θ ) 1− η
1− η + ηλ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
demand-side extensive-margin effect (+)
−∆ ln
 (1− τt)(1+ 1θ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
supply-side extensive-margin effect (-)
−
1−η
η
1−η
η
+ µt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
alternative investment effect (?)
 . (43)
If the demand- and the supply-side extensive-margin effects dominate the neoclassical
effect, the rightward shift of the credit demand curve dominates that of the credit supply
curve. If so, the right panel of figure 8 shows that the credit market equilibrium moves
from point E to E˜ with a higher interest rate, r˜t > rt.
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Define B ≡ σρη + 2 + ηλ
1−η [σ(ρη + 1) +
θ
1+θ
] and ψˆA ≡
B−
√
B2−4(σρη+1)( ηλ
1−η+1)
2(σρη+1)
as a
function of λ. Define λˆ as the solution to the function of 1− λ = ψˆA.
According to lemma 1, the equity-investment ratio increases in aggregate income.
Thus, ψt can be used as a proxy for Yt.
Lemma 2. If σ > 0 and λ ∈ (λˆ, 1) or if σ = 0, the interest rate is lower in the country
with the higher income.
If σ > 0 and λ ∈ (0, λˆ), the interest rate is higher in the country with the marginally
higher income for ψt ∈ (ψˆA, 1 − λ), while the interest rate is lower in the country with
the marginally higher income for ψt ∈ (0, ψˆA)
⋃
(1− λ, 1).
ψt
O λ2λ1 λ5λ 1
1
SD(−)BI(+)
BD(−)
σ=5
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Figure 9: The Direction of Interest Rate Responses to Income Changes: σ > 0
Figure 9 shows the sign of the interest rate response to the aggregate income change in
the (λ, ψt) space. The solid curves between region BI and BD show the threshold values
ψˆA in the cases of σ = 1, 2, 5, respectively. Consider the case of σ > 0 and λ ∈ (0, λˆ).
Keeping λ constant, if the country starts with a very low level of income, ψt is so low that
the allocation is initially in region BD where the borrowing constraints are binding. Due
to the very low income level, the neoclassical effect dominates the extensive-margin effect
so that the interest rate declines in Yt. Along the convergence path to the steady state, Yt
rises and so does ψt. If ψt > ψˆA, the country enters into region BI where the borrowing
constraints are still binding. Given the intermediate level of income, the neoclassical
effect is dominated by the extensive-margin effect so that the interest rate increases in
Yt. If Yt rises further such that ψt > 1 − λ, the country enters into region SD where
the borrowing constraints are s lack. Then, the extensive margin is mute and, due to the
neoclassical effect is active, the interest rate declines in Yt. As shown in subsection 2.1,
the larger the σ, the stronger the extensive-margin effect, the more likely the interest rate
responds positively to income changes, the larger the region BI. See figure 9.
Figure 10 shows that for λ ∈ (0, λˆ), the interest rate is non-monotonic with aggregate
income. Let us focus on the interest rate response to income change around the steady
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state. Given λ ∈ (0, λˆ), if the parameter configuration makes ψA in region BI, the interest
rate rises in aggregate income around the steady state, as shown in the middle panel of
figure 10; if {λ, ψA} is in region BD or SD, the interest rate declines in aggregate income
around the steady state, as shown in the left and the right panels of figure 10.
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Figure 10: Interest Rate Responses to Income Changes
For λ ∈ (λˆ, 1), λ is sufficiently high and hence, the cross-sector investment distortion is
mild. A rise in Yt only leads to a small extensive-margin effect which is always dominated
by the neoclassical effect. Thus, the interest rate always declines in aggregate income.
To sum up, if financial frictions and the sector-specific MIR distort the cross-sector
investment µt+1 < 1, the relative final good price reflects the distortion on the intratem-
poral dimension, χt+1 = (µt+1)
α < 1, while the interest rate reflects the distortion on the
intertemporal dimension, rt = Υt(1− η+ ηµt+1) < Υt. The two relative prices are linked
through the sectoral rate-of-return ratio µt+1. In the case of σ > 0, a rise in aggregate
income may raise them through the extensive-margin channel.
A.2 Financial Integration and Multiple Steady States
From period t = 0 on, agents in country i are allowed to borrow and lend abroad. As a
small open economy, country i takes the world interest rate as given, rit = r
∗. Without
loss of generality, we assume r∗ = rA.
Let φit denote the ratio of financial outflow over domestic saving, with the negative
value for the case of financial inflows. Capital mobility affects the total funds for domestic
investment, M i,At +M
i,B
t = w
i
t(1−φit). The composite good is freely traded and serves as
the vehicle for international borrowing/lending, while two final goods are not traded.26
Under financial integration, there exists a threshold value w¯F such that, given r
i
t = r
∗,
for wit ∈ (0, w¯F ), the borrowing constraints are binding, µit+1 < 1, and the aggregate
dynamics of the country are characterized by {wit, ψit, it, µit+1,Γit, φit,Υit, χit+1} satisfying
26In our model, there are three goods, i.e., a composite good and two final goods. Our results in this
subsection hold if and only if one of them is freely traded. It does not have to be the composite good.
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equations (13), (21), (44)-(46),27
φit = 1−
[1− (it)−(1+θ)][ 1η − (1− µit+1)]
µit+1ψ
i
t
, (44)
wit+1 =
[
R
ρ
Γitw
i
t(1− φit)
]α
, where Γit ≡
(µit+1)
η
1− η(1− µit+1)
< 1, and
∂Γit
∂µit+1
> 0, (45)
Υit = ρ
wit+1
wit(1− φit)
, rit = r
∗ = Υit(1− η + ηµit+1) < Υit, χit+1 = (µit+1)α. (46)
For wit > w¯F , the cross-sector investment is efficient µ
i
t+1 = 1 and the borrowing con-
straints are slack. A rise (fall) in aggregate income affects domestic saving, leading to fi-
nancial capital outflows (inflows). Thus, the law of motion for wage is flat at wit+1 =
(
R
r∗
)ρ
.
One can solve for w¯F by putting µ
i
t+1 = 1 in equations (13), (21), (44)-(46).
Consider the case of σ = 0. According to lemma 2, the extensive margin is mute. If the
country has the period-0 income Y i0 > YA, the autarkic interest rate would be lower than
the world level, ri0 < r
∗ = rA, due to the neoclassical effect. Upon financial integration,
households lend abroad for a higher interest rate and financial capital outflows reduces
the total funds available for domestic investment. Meanwhile, the rise in the interest
rate reduces the entrepreneurs’ borrowing capacity so that the investment in sector A
declines. Due to the decline in the domestic investment and the worsening of the cross-
sector composition, aggregate output in period t = 1 is lower than under autarky. The
law of motion for wage is globally concave and flatter around the autarkic steady state.
Proposition 4. Under financial integration, if σ = 0 and r∗ = rA, the autarkic steady
state is still the unique, stable steady state but the convergence to the steady state is faster
than under autarky; if σ > 0 and r∗ = rA, the autarkic steady state may become unstable
so that multiple steady states may arise.
Consider the case of σ > 0. Figure 11 shows the parameter configuration for multiple
steady states under financial integration in the (λ, ψA) space, given σ = 1 and σ = 2,
respectively. The blue dashed curve shows the threshold value ψˆA defined for lemma 2
in subsection 3.1. The solid and the dash-dotted curves in figure 12 show the laws of
motion for wage under financial integration versus under autarky, with the parameter
configuration in the five regions of figure 11, respectively.
Consider the parameter configuration in region B. As shown in the upper-left panel of
figure 12, if the country’s initial income is higher (lower) than in the autarkic steady state
wi0 > wS (w
i
0 < wS), financial integration makes it converge to a new stable steady state
H (L) with wiH > wS (w
i
L < wS). Thus, financial integration destabilizes the autarkic
steady state and creates multiple steady states. The intuition is as follows.
According to lemma 2, if σ > 0 and the cross-sector investment is inefficient under
autarky, a rise in aggregate income may raise or reduce the interest rate, depending on
the relative magnitude of the extensive-margin effect and the neoclassical effect. For the
parameter configuration {λ, ψA} in region BI of figure 9, an increase in Y it raises the
27See the proof of Proposition 4 in appendix B for the derivation.
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Figure 11: Parameter configuration for Multiple Steady States under Financial Integra-
tion
autarkic interest rate and, according to equation (39), the interest rate effect dampens
the rises in the aggregate credit demand and the investment in sector A.
Consider first the case of Y i0 > YA. Had the country stayed under autarky, the interest
rate would be higher than the world level ri0 > r
∗ = rA. Upon financial integration, finan-
cial capital flows into this country, which affects domestic investment in two ways. First,
capital inflows directly raise the size of the total funds available for domestic investment
so that the sectoral investment rises on the intensive margin; second, capital inflows push
the interest rate down to the world level and the entrepreneurs can borrow and invest
more, which improves the cross-sector investment composition on the extensive margin.
By the same logic, if Y i0 < YA, the country witnesses financial capital outflows, which
directly reduces the size of domestic investment and indirectly worsens the cross-sector
investment composition and the aggregate allocation efficiency.
For the parameter configuration in region B of figure 11, the low λ implies the severe
cross-sector investment distortion and the strong cross-sector composition effect under
autarky. Under financial integration, the direct size effect and the indirect composition
effect are so large that the slope of the law of motion for wage around the autarkic steady
state exceeds unity, as shown in the upper-left panel of figure 12.
To sum up, financial integration affects directly the size and indirectly the composition
of domestic investment. In particular, by keeping the intertemporal relative price (the
interest rate) constant, financial integration eliminates the dampening effect (i.e., the
positive interest rate response to the aggregate income change under autarky) on the
sector-A investment, which amplifies the cross-sector composition effect. The size effect
and the composition effect jointly destabilize the autarkic steady state. The positive
interest rate response to the aggregate income change results from the extensive-margin
effect and so does the cross-sector composition effect. Thus, the existence of multiple
steady states depends on the magnitude of the extensive-margin effect.
Starting from region B of figure 11, let us reduce m so that ψA rises and the parameter
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Figure 12: Phase Diagrams of Wage under Financial Integrations
configuration moves upwards into region BC where the borrowing constraints are slack
and the cross-sector investment is efficient in the autarkic steady state µA = 1. The
autarkic interest rate, which coincides with the social rate of return, declines in aggregate
income, due to the neoclassical effect. A marginal increase in aggregate income above
the autarkic steady state tends to reduce the autarkic interest rate. Given r∗ = rA,
financial integration leads to financial capital outflow so that domestic investment and
output decline in period t + 1. Thus, the law of motion for wage is flat at the autarkic
steady state with wit+1 =
(
R
r∗
)ρ
=
(
R
ρ
)ρ
= wS and hence, the autarkic steady state is
locally stable. However, for wit  wS, ψit enters into region BI of figure 9 where the
interest rate responds positively to income change and financial integration affects the
size and the composition of domestic investment in the same way as in case B. As shown
in the upper-right panel of figure 12, besides the stable autarkic steady state S, there are
another stable steady state L and an unstable steady state M.
Starting from region B of figure 11, let us raise m so that ψA declines and the param-
eter configuration moves downwards into region AB where the borrowing constraints are
binding in the autarkic steady state. In region AB, the interest rate response to income
change is either negative or slightly positive around the autarkic steady state so that fi-
nancial integration does not destabilize the autarkic steady state. However, for wit  wS,
ψit enters into region BI in figure 9 where the interest rate response to income change is
strongly positive so that financial integration affects the size and the cross-sector compo-
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sition of domestic investment in the same way as in case B. As shown in the upper-middle
panel of figure 12, besides the stable autarkic steady state S, there are another stable
steady state H and an unstable steady state M with wH > wM > wS.
In region AB-B-BC, financial integration generates multiple steady states and hence,
the initial income matters for the convergence path and the long-run allocation.
The higher the λ, the less the sectoral investment distortion, the smaller the efficiency
loss, the weaker the extensive-margin effect and the cross-sector composition effect. Thus,
for the parameter configurations in region A and C of figure 11, financial integration does
not generate multiple steady states but it affects the convergence path. See the lower-left
and lower-right panels of figure 12.
Relationship to Matsuyama (2004)
Matsuyama (2004) shows in a one-sector OLG model that financial integration may lead
to income divergence. He assumes that all agents have the identical labor endowment
and the individual investment project is indivisible with a fixed size at unity. Aggregate
investment adjusts only on the extensive margin and agents who can borrow and invest
are randomly determined by lottery.
In our model, if θ →∞, the distribution of labor endowment degenerates into a unit
mass at lj = 1 so that all agents have the identical labor endowment; if m = 1 and σ = 1,
the MIR is constant at one; if η = 1, only sector A is active. Putting them together,
our model degenerates into the model of Matsuyama (2004). In particular, figure 11
essentially coincides with figure 5 in Matsuyama (2004).28
In our model, we set θ <∞ and assume the MIR so that the adjustment of aggregate
investment takes place on the intensive and the extensive margins; we set σ > 0 so that
the MIR becomes aggregate-income dependent and one can control the magnitude of the
extensive-margin effect by changing σ; we set η ∈ (0, 1) so that one can analyze the
impacts of trade integration.
In Matsuyama (2004), if the interest rate responds positively to income change around
the autarkic steady state, financial integration destabilizes the autarkic steady state
purely through the aggregate investment size effect. In our model, besides the direct
size effect, financial capital flows also indirectly affect the cross-sector composition and
the aggregate allocation efficiency, which is another amplification mechanism.
A.3 Income Divergence in A World Economy
As shown in subsection 2.2, given the parameter configurations in region SU and BU of
figure 2, an individual country converges monotonically to a unique, stable steady state
with aggregate income at YA under autarky. As a collection of autarkic countries, the
world economy has a unique, stable steady state under autarky which is symmetric, i.e.,
all countries end up with the same income level YA in the long run.
In the case of financial integration, the interest rate is determined globally at r∗t
and the credit market clears at the world level. Although the symmetric steady state
28See Zhang (2013) for the detailed analysis of the one-sector version of our model.
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mentioned above is still a steady state for the world economy, it may not be stable and
there may exist stable, asymmetric steady states, i.e., the world economy is polarized
into two groups of countries with the different steady-state income.
By the same logic as for the case of trade integration, given the parameter configura-
tion in region B of figure 11, the world economy has a continuum of stable asymmetric
steady states under financial integration where a fraction δ ∈ (δ−, δ+) of countries have
the income YL < YA and the rest have the income YH > YA. The proof follows that of
Proposition 4 of Matsuyama (2004).
If the asymmetric steady state is stable under financial integration, the world economy
is inevitably polarized into the rich and the poor. This way, financial integration may
lead to income divergence rather than convergence among nations. It offers a theoretical
support for the view that international capital flow is a mechanism through which rich
countries become richer at the expense of poor countries.
B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The proof consists of two steps. First, we prove that, given the aggregate income
Y it , or equivalently the wage w
i
t, if the borrowing constraints are binding, q
i,A
t+1R > r
i
t, or
equivalently, µit+1 < 1, one can solve 
i
t, ψ
i
t, and µ
i
t+1 by using equations (13), (21)-(22).
Second, we derive the condition under which the borrowing constraints are binding.
Combine equations (6) and (10) and use the definition of µit+1 to get (21). Combine
equations (5), (12), (17) to get (22) as follows,
ηµit+1
1− η + ηµit+1
=
M i,At
wit
=
∫ it
1
nij,t
ψit
dG(j) =
1− (it)−(1+θ)
ψit
.
With the aggregate labor supply constant at Lt = 1, equations (1)-(2) imply that the
wage is proportional to aggregate income, wit = (1 − α)Y it . Combine equations (13),
(21)-(22) to solve for µit+1 and 
i
t as the functions of Y
i
t ,
σ lnY it = ln(1−
λ
µit+1
) +
1
1 + θ
ln(1− η + ηµit+1)−
1
1 + θ
ln(1− η + ηλ) + lnm
+ ln
θ
(θ + 1)
− ln(1− α), (47)
∂ lnµit+1
∂ lnY it
=
σ
λ
µit+1−λ
+ 1
1+θ
ηµit+1
1−η+ηµit+1
, ⇒ sgn
(
∂µit+1
∂Y it
)
= sgn(σ), (48)
∂ lnµit+1
∂ lnλ
=
η
1−η+ηλ +
1+θ
µit+1−λ
1
λ
ηµit+1
1−η+ηµit+1
+ 1+θ
µit+1−λ
> 0,
∂ lnµit+1
∂ lnm
=
−1
λ
µit+1−λ
+ 1
1+θ
ηµit+1
1−η+ηµit+1
< 0, (49)
it =
(
1− η + ηµit+1
1− η + ηλ
) 1
1+θ
,
∂ ln it
∂ lnµit+1
=
1
1 + θ
ηµit+1
1− η + ηµit+1
> 0. (50)
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Consider the boundary case where the borrowing constraints are weakly binding and the
cross-sector investment is efficient µit+1 = 1. Rewrite equation (47) as
m = (Y it )
σΛ, where Λ ≡ (1− η + ηλ)
1
1+θ
1− λ (1− α)(1 +
1
θ
) and
∂Λ
∂λ
> 0. (51)
Given Y it , equations (49)-(50) show that µ
i
t+1 rises (declines) in λ (m) and so does the
cutoff value it. Thus, for m > (Y
i
t )
σΛ, µit+1 < 1 so that the borrowing constraints are
binding and the cross-sector investment is inefficient; otherwise, for m < (Y it )
σΛ, the
borrowing constraints are slack and the cross-sector investment is efficient µit+1 = 1.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Combine equations (1)-(5) to get the law of motion for wage (23) under autarky.
Consider the case of σ = 0. According to lemma 1, for m > Λ, the borrowing
constraints are binding and equation (47) implies that the sectoral rate-of-return ratio is
constant and independent of aggregate income µit+1 = µA < 1; for m ≤ Λ, the borrowing
constraints are slack and µt+1 = µA = 1. Combine µ
i
t+1 = µA with equation (23) to get
the law of motion for wage (25), which is strictly concave and crosses the 45◦ line once
and only once from the left. Thus, there exists a unique, stable steady state.
Consider the case of σ > 0. According to lemma 1, for wit ≥ w¯A ≡ (1−α)Y¯A, the cross-
sector investment is efficient µit+1 = 1 and the law of motion for wage is strictly concave
wit+1 =
(
R
ρ
wit
)α
; for wit ∈ (0, w¯A), the cross-sector investment is inefficient, µit+1 ∈ (λ, 1),
and the law of motion for wage is determined jointly by equations (52)-(53),
(wit)
σ =
(
1− η + ηµit+1
1− η + ηλ
) 1
1+θ
(1− λ
µit+1
)F, (52)
wit+1 =
(
R
ρ
witΓ
i
t
)α
, where Γit ≡
(µit+1)
η
1− η + ηµit+1
(53)
Evaluate the first derivative of the law of motion for wage at any steady state if exists,
∂wit+1
∂wit
‖wit+1=wit = α︸︷︷︸
neoclassical effect
1 +
σ(1− µit+1) η(1−η)1−η+ηµit+1
λ
µit+1−λ
+ 1
1+θ
ηµit+1
1−η+ηµit+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
cross-sector composition effect
 . (54)
The necessary and sufficient condition for a steady state to be stable is
∂wit+1
∂wit
‖wit+1=wit < 1.
In the case of σ > 0, if the cross-sector composition effect is so strong that
∂wit+1
∂wit
‖wit+1=wit >
1, the steady state is unstable and there may exist multiple steady states, as discussed in
subsection 2.2. The border between regions BU and BM as well as between regions SU
and SM in figure 2 show the parameter configurations in the {λ, ψA} space with which
the law of motion for wage is tangent with the 45◦ line at wit ∈ (0, w¯A). The parameter
configurations for the boundary are calculated in three steps:
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• set ∂wit+1
∂wit
‖wit+1=wit = 1 to solve µit+1 as a function of λ;
• plug µit+1 into equations (52)-(53) and compute wit+1 and wit, respectively;
• equalize wit+1 with wit to solve ψA as a function of λ.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The proof consists of three steps.
Step 1: derive the model solutions (31)-(33) under trade integration
Given the relative final good price determined globally χit = χ
∗ from period t = 1
on, the market clearing condition for final good f in country i is Zi,ft (1 + ς
i,f
t ) = Y
i,f
t .
Combine it with equations (1)-(2) to get
qi,At+1RM
i,A
t
qi,Bt+1RM
i,B
t
=
M i,At
µit+1M
i,B
t
=
η
1− η
(1 + ς i,At+1)
(1 + ς i,Bt+1)
. (55)
With no international borrowing and lending, domestic investment is financed by domestic
saving, M i,At +M
i,B
t = w
i
t. Combine it with equation (55) and (28) to get
M i,At =
ηµit+1(1 + ς
i,A
t+1)
1− η(1− µit+1)(1 + ς i,At+1)
wit and M
i,B
t =
(1− η)(1 + ς i,Bt+1)
1− η(1− µit+1)(1 + ς i,At+1)
wit. (56)
Combine equation (56) with (1)-(2), (28) to get (33) as the law of motion for wage.
According to equations (29)-(30), the relative final good price is determined at the
world level χit = χ
∗ and so are the sectoral rate-of-return ratio and the equity-investment
ratio, µit = µ
∗ and ψit = ψ
∗. According to equation (13), the cutoff value is loglinear in
the wage. For wit ≤ wT ≡ (ψ∗F)
1
σ , nobody can meet the MIR, it = 1, and the country
specializes completely in sector B, ς i,At+1 = −1.
For the parameter configuration in region BU of figure 2, the cross-sector investment is
inefficient at the autarkic steady state µA < 1. Given µ
i
t+1 = µ
∗ = µA < 1, the borrowing
constraints are binding and the investment in sector A is∫ it
1
nij,t
ψit
dF (j) = w
i
t
1− (it)−(1+θ)
1− λ
µit+1
= M i,At = w
i
t
µit+1
1
η(1+ςi,At+1)
− (1− µit+1)
(57)
⇒ ς i,At+1 = [η(1− µ∗ +
µ∗ − λ
1− (it)−(1+θ)
)]−1 − 1. (58)
Given ψit = ψ
∗ under trade integration, the higher aggregate income allows more agents
to invest in sector A,
∂it
∂wit
> 0, which reduces the imports or raises the exports of good
A. There is a threshold value w¯T such that for w
i
t = w¯T , the mass of entrepreneurs is so
high that they borrow the entire saving of households and invest in sector A M i,At = w
i
t.
Combine it with (57) to get ς i,At+1 =
1−η
η
, implying that the country specializes completely
in sector A. Combine it with equations (58) and (31) to get it =
(
µ∗
λ
) 1
1+θ and w¯T =(
µ∗
λ
) 1
σ(1+θ) wT . Thus, equations (31)-(32) characterize the solutions to 
i
t and ς
i,A
t+1.
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Step 2: the shape of the law of motion for wage under trade integration
For simplicity, we suppress the country index i. Under trade integration, the law of
motion for wage is a piecewise function. Given the world relative final good price χ∗ and
the related µ∗, combine equations (31)-(33) to get the law of motion for wage in log,
lnwt+1 = α(lnwt + ln Γt + ln
R
ρ
),
∂ lnwt+1
∂ lnwt
= α︸︷︷︸
neoclassical effect
1 + ∂ ln Γt∂ ln t ∂ ln t∂ lnwt︸ ︷︷ ︸
specialization effect
 ;
ln Γt =

η lnµ∗, if wt ∈ (0, wT ];
η lnµ∗ + ln
[
1−λ
µ∗−λ − 1−µ
∗
µ∗−λ
−(1+θ)
t
]
, where t =
wσt
ψ∗F , if wt ∈ (wT , w¯T );
(η − 1) lnµ∗, if wt ≥ w¯T .
∂ ln Γt
∂ ln t
=

0, if wt ∈ (0, wT ];
(1+θ) 1−µ
∗
µ∗−λ 
−(1+θ)
t
1−λ
µ∗−λ− 1−µ
∗
µ∗−λ 
−(1+θ)
t
> 0 and
∂ ln t
∂ lnwt
= σ, if wt ∈ (wT , w¯T );
0, if wt ≥ w¯T .
For wt ∈ (0, wT ], the country specializes completely in sector B; for wt > w¯T , it specializes
completely in sector A. In either case, the change in aggregate income does not affect
aggregate allocation efficiency ∂ ln Γt
∂ lnwt
= 0 so that, due to the neoclassical effect, the law
of motion for wage is increasing and concave, or equivalently, log-linear with the slope
∂ lnwt+1
∂ lnwt
= α < 1.
For wt ∈ (wT , w¯T ), the country produces both final goods, t > 1.
J ≡ ∂wt+1
∂wt
= α
[
1 + σ
(1 + θ)PX
1 +P(1−X)
]
wt+1
wt
, where X ≡ −(1+θ)t ∈ (0, 1), P ≡
1− µ∗
µ∗ − λ ≥ 0,
∂wt+1
∂(wt)2
= −
{
σ(1 + θ)PX[σ(1 + θ)− 1]
[1 +P−PX+PXσ(1 + θ)] + (1− α)
1 +P+PX[σ(1 + θ)− 1]
1 +P−PX
}
J
wt
• In the case of σ = 0, the change in aggregate income does not affect the cross-
sector investment composition
∂ ln t
∂ lnwt
= 0; in the case of σ > 0 and µ∗ = 1, the
rate of return equalizes in the two sectors so that the change in aggregate income
does not affect aggregate allocation efficiency Γt = 1. In either case, the law of
motion for wage is increasing and concave, or equivalently, log-linear with the slope
∂ lnwt+1
∂ lnwt
= α < 1, due to the neoclassical effect.
• In the case of σ > 0 and µ∗ < 1, sector A has a higher return than sector B so
that agents who can meet the MIR invest their entire labor income in sector A and
borrow to the limit. For wt > wA, a rise in wt allows more agents to meet the MIR
and invest in sector A,
∂ ln t
∂ lnwt
> 0; the country specializes towards the higher return
sector (A), which improves the allocation efficiency of domestic saving ∂ ln Γt
∂ ln t
> 0 and
wt+1. Thus, the trade-driven specialization amplifies the income change through the
extensive-margin channel, making the law of motion for wage steeper ∂ lnwt+1
∂ lnwt
> α
around the autarkic steady state. In the case of σ > 0 and µ∗ < 1, the law of
motion for wage is concave.
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Overall, given σ > 0 and µ∗ < 1, the law of motion for wage is a piecewise function
over three intervals and there are two kinks at wt = wT and wt = w¯T . Within each
interval, it is increasing and concave.
Step 3: the threshold values for multiple steady states under trade integration
For the parameter configuration in region SU, ψA ≥ 1 − λ and χA = µA = 1. Given
χ∗ = χA and hence µ∗ = µA = 1, the law of motion for wage is log-linear with the slope
∂ lnwt+1
∂ lnwt
= α < 1 under trade integration and hence, there exists a unique steady state.
Given χ∗ = χA and accordingly, µ∗ = µA, figure 4 shows that three threshold values
split region BU of figure 2 into four regions. Figure 5 shows the law of motion for wage
in the five cases, respectively. In the following, we derive the three threshold values.
For the parameter configuration in region BU, ψA < 1−λ and µA < 1 so that χA < 1.
If the specialization effect is sufficiently strong, the slope of the law of motion for wage
at the autarkic steady state is larger than unity so that multiple steady states arise. Use
equations (21)-(22) to solve µA and A as the implicit functions of λ and ψA. Combine
them with µ∗ = µA and
∂wt+1
∂wt
‖wt+1=wt = 1 to get,
ψˆT = (1− λ)
[
1− 1
σρ(1 + θ)(1−η
λ
+ η) + 1
]
,
which defines the border between region B1 and AB of figure 4.
Given λ, for ψA < ψˆT , the country with the initial income Y0 < YA specializes
completely in sector B under trade integration. If the kink point of the law of motion
for wage at wt = w¯T is below (above) the 45
◦ line, the country with Y0 > YA specialize
partially (completely) in sector A. Use equations (13), (21)-(23) to solve µA, A, F,
and wA as the functions of λ and ψA. Combine them with µ
∗ = µA and
[
R
ρ
(µ∗)η−1
]ρ
= w¯T
to get,
ψ˜T = 1− λ
1− η
[(
1− η
λ
+ η
) 1
σρ(1+θ)+1
− η
]
,
which defines the border between region B2 and B1 of figure 4.
Given λ, for ψA ∈ (ψˆ, 1 − λ), the law of motion for wage under trade integration
has a slope less than unity at the autarkic steady state. Thus, the autarkic steady state
is still stable, but it may not be unique. There exist other steady states under trade
integration if the kink point of the law of motion for wage at wt = wT is below the 45
◦
line, i.e.,
[
R
ρ
(µ∗)η
]ρ
≤ wT . Use equations (13), (21)-(23) to solve µA, A, F, and wA as
the functions of λ and ψA. Combine them with µ
∗ = µA and
[
R
ρ
(µ∗)η
]ρ
= w¯T to get,
ψ¯T = 1− ηλ
[1− η + ηλ] 1σρ(1+θ)+1 − (1− η)
,
which defines the border between region AB and A of figure 4.
Proof of Proposition 3
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Proof. We focus on the case of σ > 0 and µ∗ < 1.29 For simplicity, we suppress the
country index i. According to figure 5, multiple steady states arise iff
1. the kink point at wt = wT is below the 45
◦ line and
2. the law of motion for wage intersects at least once with the 45◦ line for wt ∈
(wT , w¯T ).
Let wM =
[
R
ρ
(µ∗)η 1−λ
µ∗−λ
(
1− 1−µ∗
1−λ 
−(1+θ)
M
)]ρ
denote the unstable steady state in the inter-
val of wt ∈ (wT , w¯T ) and wL ≡
[
R
ρ
(µ∗)η
]ρ
denote the stable steady state in wt ∈ (0, wT ),
where M is the cutoff value related to wM . The two conditions are formulated technically
as
wL < wT , and
∂wt+1
∂wt
‖wM = α + ασ
(1 + θ)1−µ
∗
1−λ 
−(1+θ)
M
1− 1−µ∗
1−λ 
−(1+θ)
M
≥ 1 (59)
Let x ≡ λ
µ∗ ∈ (λ, 1), A ≡ ρσ(1 + θ), and B ≡ ρση. Conditions (59) are simplified as
x ≥ xc ≡ (A+ 1)λ
A+ λ
> λ, and L ≡ 1
F
(
R
ρ
λη
)ρσ
≤ R ≡ xB(1− x) (60)
R is a hump-shaped function of x with the unconstrained maximum value Ro ≡
BB
(B+1)B+1
at xo = B
B+1
∈ (0, 1) and with the minimum value R = 0 at x = 0 and x = 1.
Let Rc ≡ (xc)B(1−xc). Given x ∈ (xc, 1), figure 13 shows the results in fives cases. The
horizontal axis shows x and the vertical axis shows R and L.
• If λ ∈ (0, AB
AB+A+1
), xc ∈ (0,xo) and R has the unconstrained maximum Ro at xo.
– If L > Ro, condition (60) does not hold so that there does not exist the stable
asymmetric steady state. See the upper-left panel of figure 13.
– If L ∈ (Rc,Ro), there are two threshold values, x− and x+. For µ∗ ∈ ( λ
x+
, λ
x− ),
there exists a stable asymmetric steady state with χ∗ = (µ∗)α and µ∗ is sup-
ported by a unique value of δ. See the upper-middle panel of figure 13.
– If L ≤ Rc there is a threshold value x+ such that for µ∗ ∈ ( λ
x+
, λ
xc
), there
exists a stable asymmetric steady state with χ∗ = (µ∗)α and µ∗ is supported
by a unique value of δ. See the upper-right panel of figure 13.
• If λ ∈ ( AB
AB+A+1
, 1), xc ∈ (xo, 1) so that R has the constrained maximum Rc at xc.
– If L > Rc, condition (60) does not hold so that there does not exist the stable
asymmetric steady state. See the lower-left panel of figure 13.
29As shown in step 2 of the proof for proposition 2, given the world relative final good price χ∗ and
the corresponding µ∗, the law of motion for wage in a small open economy under trade integration is a
piecewise function over three intervals. If either σ = 0 or µ∗ = 1, the law of motion for wage is globally
concave and differentiable, wt+1 =
(
R
ρ wtΓ
∗
)α
, so that there exists a unique steady state under trade
integration. If σ > 0 and µ∗ < 1, the law of motion for wage has two kinks and is concave within each
interval, which may give rise to multiple steady states under trade integration.
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Figure 13: The Existence of Asymmetric Steady States
– If L ∈ (0,Rc) there is a threshold value x+. For µ∗ ∈ ( λ
x+
, λ
xc
), there exists
a stable asymmetric steady state with χ∗ = (µ∗)α and µ∗ is supported by a
unique value of δ. See the lower-right panel of figure 13.
According to the five cases mentioned above, for λ ∈ (0, AB
AB+A+1
), the threshold value
ψ¯SBT is the solution to L ≡ 1F
(
R
ρ
λη
)ρσ
= Ro = (xo)B(1 − xo); for λ ∈ ( AB
AB+A+1
, 1), the
threshold value ψ¯SBT is the solution to L ≡ 1F
(
R
ρ
λη
)ρσ
= Rc = (xc)B(1 − xc). Figure 6
shows ψ¯SBT as the function of λ in the {λ, ψA} space.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. As the wage rate is linear in aggregate income wt = (1 − α)Yt, we use the wage
rate and aggregate income interchangeably as follows.
Combine equations (1)-(2) to get qBt+1 = w
− 1
ρ
t+1µ
η
t+1. Combine it with equations (6),
(20), and (23) to get (24) as the solution to the interest rate under autarky.
In the case of σ = 0, the extensive margin is mute so that the sectoral rate-of-return
ratio is constant µt+1 = µA. Thus, the interest rate is proportional to the social rate of
return, which, due to the neoclassical effect, is a decreasing, log-linear function of the
wage. Combine equations (20), (23), and (24) to get,
ln Υt = lnwt+1 − lnwt + ln ρ = (α− 1) lnwt + α ln R
ρ
ΓA + ln ρ, (61)
ln rt = ln Υt + ln(1− η + ηµA), ∂ ln rt
∂ lnwt
=
∂ ln Υt
∂ lnwt
= α︸︷︷︸
neoclassical effect
−1 < 0. (62)
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In the case of σ > 0 and wt ≥ w¯A, the cross-sector investment is efficient µt+1 = 1 and
rt = Υt. Due to the neoclassical effect, the social rate of return declines in aggregate
income and so does the interest rate. In both cases, the autarkic interest rate is lower in
the rich than in the poor country.
If σ > 0 and wt < w¯A, the cross-sector investment is inefficient µt+1 ∈ (λ, 1) and
the borrowing constraints are binding, ψt = 1 − λµt+1 ∈ (0, 1 − λ). In the following, we
derive the condition under which the interest rate is a non-monotonic function of the
wage for wt ∈ (0, w¯A). Since ψt increases in wt under autarky, it is equivalent to derive
the condition under which rt is a non-monotonic function of ψt.
Combine equations (13), (20)-(24) to get,
ln rt = (α− 1) lnwt + α ln Γt + ln(1− η + ηµt+1) + α ln R
ρ
+ ln ρ (63)
∂ lnwt
∂ lnψt
=
1
σ
∂ ln t
∂ lnψt
+
1
σ
,
∂ ln t
∂ lnψt
=
λ
1+θ
ψt
1−ψt
λ+ 1−η
η
(1− ψt)
,
∂ lnµt+1
∂ lnψt
=
ψt
1− ψt (64)
∂ ln rt
∂ lnψt
= αη
ψt
1− ψt + (1− α)[(θ + 1−
1
σ
)
λ
1+θ
ψt
1−ψt
λ+ 1−η
η
− 1−η
η
ψt
− 1
σ
] = 0 (65)
⇒ Aψ2t −Bψt +C = 0, (66)
A ≡ σρη + 1, B ≡ σρη + 2 + ηλ
1− η [σ(ρη + 1) +
θ
1 + θ
], C ≡ λη
1− η + 1. (67)
Given the model parameters, equation (66) is a quadratic function of ψt ∈ (0, 1). For ψt =
0, the left-hand-side of equation (66) is positive; for ψt = 1, the left-hand-side of equation
(66) is negative. Thus, for ψt ∈ (0, 1), there exists a unique solution ψˆA = B−
√
B2−4AC
2A
making ∂ ln rt
∂ lnψt
= 0. For ψt ∈ (0, ψˆA), ∂ ln rt∂ lnψt < 0; for ψt ∈ (ψˆA, 1− λ), ∂ ln rt∂ lnψt > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. The proof consists of three steps. For simplicity, we suppress the country index i.
Step 1: derive the model solutions (44)-(46) under financial integration
Given the interest rate determined globally rt = r
∗ from period t = 0 on, financial
flows affects the total funds available for domestic investment, MAt + M
B
t = (1 − φt)wt.
Combine it with equation (1)-(5) to get the sectoral investment
MAt =
ηµt+1
1− η + ηµt+1 (1− φt)wt and M
B
t =
1− η
1− η + ηµt+1 (1− φt)wt. (68)
Thus, the law of motion for wage is characterized by equation (45). For wt ∈ (0, w¯F ), the
borrowing constraints are binding and the investment in sector A is
ηµt+1
1− η + ηµt+1 (1− φt)wt = M
A
t =
∫ t
1
nj,t
ψt
dF (j) = wt
1− −(1+θ)t
ψt
, (69)
which gives equation (44) as the solution to φt. Following the proof of lemma 2, one can
get equations (46) as the solutions to the social rate of return and the interest rate.
Step 2: the shape of the law of motion for wage under financial integration
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Under financial integration, the law of motion for wage is piecewise. Given the world
interest rate r∗, for wt > w¯F , the borrowing constraints are slack, µt+1 = 1, and the
law of motion for wage is flat at wt+1 = w¯t+1 ≡
(
R
r∗
)ρ
; for wt ∈ (0, w¯F ), the borrowing
constraints are binding, µt+1 ∈ (λ, 1), and the law of motion for wage is implicitly defined
by four equations for {wt, ψt, µt+1, t}
µt+1 =
λ
1− ψt ,
Rµηt+1
w
1
ρ
t+1
= RqBt+1 = rt = r
∗, wσt = ψttF,
wt+1
wt
=
1− −(1+θ)t
ψtµt+1
r∗
ηρ
, (70)
∂µt+1
∂ψt
=
λ
(1− ψt)2 > 0,
∂ψt
∂wt
=
S+ σ(1− S)
G+ 1
ψt
wt
> 0, (71)
where S ≡ 1−−(1+θ)t
1+θ
−(1+θ)
t
and G ≡ (1 + ηρ) ψt
1−ψtS. As both final goods are essential for the
composition good production, both sectors are active, t > 1 so that S ∈ (0, 1). Given
∂ψt
∂wt
> 0, for wt → 0, ψt → 0 so that µt+1 → λ and wt+1 → wt+1 ≡
(
Rλη
r∗
)ρ
. Thus,
the law of motion for wage has a positive intercept on the vertical axis at wt+1. Let
Z ≡ 1− ψt − S1−S − (1 + ηρ)θψtS2.
J ≡ ∂wt+1
∂wt
=
ηρ[S+ σ(1− S)]
G+ 1
ψt
1− ψt
wt+1
wt
> 0, if σ ≥ 0; (72)
for σ = 0, H ≡ ∂
2wt+1
∂w2t
= −
[
1− S
GS
(2 + θS) +
ηρ+G
G
ψt
1− ψt
]
S
G+ 1
J
wt
< 0; (73)
for σ = 1, H ≡ ∂
2wt+1
∂w2t
= Z
1− S
G+ 1
1 + ηρ
ηρ
1
1− ψt
J2
wt+1
⇒ sgn (H) = sgn(Z). (74)
In the case of σ = 0, the law of motion for wage is piecewise with a positive intercept
on the vertical axis at wt+1, concave for wt ∈ (0, w¯T ], and flat at w¯t+1 for wt > w¯F .
In the case of σ = 1,
∂Z
∂wt
= −
{
[1 + (1 + ηρ)θS2t ]ψt
(G+ 1)wt
+
(1− S)(1 + θS)G
(G+ 1)wt
[
1
(1− S)2 + 2θ(1− ψ
i
t)G
]}
< 0.
Given ∂ψt
∂wt
> 0, for wt → 0, ψt → 0, so that Z > 0 and the law of motion for wage is
convex. Since ∂Z
∂wt
< 0, it is possible that, for wt → w¯F , ψt → 1 − λ so that Z < 0 and
the law of motion for wage becomes concave. Let wˇt define the threshold value such that
Z = 0, i.e., the inflection point of the law of motion for wage. There are two cases.
• Case 1: if wˇt > w¯F , the law of motion for wage is piecewise with a positive intercept
on the vertical axis at wt+1, convex for wt ∈ (0, w¯), and flat at w¯t+1 for wt > w¯F .
• Case 2: if wˇt < w¯F , the law of motion for wage is piecewise with a positive intercept
on the vertical axis at wt+1, convex for wt ∈ (0, wˇ), concave for wt ∈ (wˇ, w¯F ), and
flat at w¯t+1 for wt > w¯F .
Step 3: the threshold values for multiple steady states under financial inte-
gration
Under financial integration, in the case of σ = 0, the law of motion for wage has a
concave-flat shape so that there exists a unique, stable steady state; in the case of σ > 0,
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the law of motion for wage has a convex-flat or convex-concave-flat shape so that multiple
steady states may arise in three cases, as shown in figure 12. Given σ > 0 and r∗ = rA,
we derive as follows the threshold values that split region BU and SU of figure 2 into five
regions of figure 11.
Case 1: consider region SU of figure 2 where µA = 1 and rA = ρ. Given r
∗ = rA = ρ,
the law of motion for wage at the autarkic steady state (S) is flat so that the autarkic
steady state is still stable under financial integration. Compare the upper-right and the
lower-right panels of figure 12. Multiple steady states arise if the law of motion for wage
intersects with the 45◦ line at wt ∈ (0, w¯F ). The boundary between region BC and C is
defined as the case where the law of motion is tangent with the 45◦ line at point M, i.e.,
wit+1 = w
i
t = wM < wA, rM = r
∗ = ρ, and JM ≡ ∂wt+1∂wt ‖wM = 1. Let DM ≡ 1 − 
−(1+θ)
M
and N ≡ ηλ. Combine the three conditions with equations (44)-(46) to get
wM < wA, ⇒
(
ψMM
ψAA
) 1
σ
=
wM
wA
=
(
λ
1− ψM
)ρη
, (75)
rM =
ρ[1− η(1− µM)]
1− φM = r
∗ = ρ, ⇒ DM = NψM
1− ψM < ηψM , (76)
JM =
ηρ[SM + σ(1− SM)]
(1 + ηρ)SM +
1−ψM
ψM
= 1, ⇒ 1− 1
ψM(ηρσ + 1)
= SM =
DM
1 + θ(1−DM) . (77)
Combine equations (76) and (77) to get[
σ +
1
ηρ(θ + 1)
]
D
2
M −
[
N
ηρ(1 + 1
θ
)
+ σ
]
DM +
N
ηρ
= 0. (78)
DM is a root of equation (78).
30 Combine the solution to DM with equation (76) to solve
for ψM and M = (1−DM)−
1
1+θ . Plug them and A = (1− ηψA)−
1
1+θ in equation (75) to
solve ψA as a function of λ, which defines the boundary between region BC and C.
Case 2: consider region BU of figure 2 where µA ∈ (λ, 1) and rA = ρ1−η(1−µA) < ρ.
See the upper-left panel of figure 12. Under financial integration, given r∗ = rA, case B
arises if JA ≡ ∂wt+1∂wt ‖wA > 1. Solve the boundary condition JA = 1 to get a threshold
value as the function of λ,
ψˆF =
B−√B2 − 4C
2
, where C =
1
(1 + σηρ)
, B = 1 +C
[
1− 1
(θ + 1)(1 + 1−η
λη
)
]
,
which defines the border between region AB and B of figure 11.
Case 3: consider the region with ψA < ψˆF in figure 11. Since JA < 1, the autarkic
steady state is still stable under financial integration. Compare the upper-middle and the
lower-left panel of figure 12. As proved above, the law of motion for wage wt ∈ (0, w¯F )
can be either convex or convex-concave. Taking that into account, financial integration
may lead to multiple steady states in two subcases.
• Case 3.1: multiple steady states arise if the kink point of the law of motion for
wage is on or above the 45◦ line. Given r∗ = rA = ρ(1− η+ ηµA), the kink point is
30According to equation (78), there are two roots for Dt. However, only one root satisfies the condition
of DM < ηψM < ηψA.
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characterized by wt = w¯F , wt+1 = w¯t+1 =
(
R
r∗
)ρ
, ψt = ψK ≡ 1− λ, µt+1 = µK = 1.
As the boundary case, the kink point is on the 45◦ line, i.e., w¯t+1 = w¯F . Combine
them with equations (70) to get,
w¯
1
ρ
t+1 =
R
r∗
=
R
rA
=
R
ρ(1− η + ηµA) , w¯
σ
F = FψKK = F(1− λ)K (79)
r∗
ηρ
1− −(1+θ)K
µKψK
=
w¯t+1
w¯F
= 1 ⇒ K =
(
1− η + ηµA
1− η + ηµA − η + ηλ
) 1
1+θ
(80)[
R
ρ(1− η + ηµA)
]ρ
= w¯t+1 = w¯F = [F(1− λ)K ]
1
σ (81)(
RµηA
ρ(1− η + ηµA)
)ρ
= wA = [FψAA]
1
σ , A =
(
1− η + ηµA
1− η + ηλ
) 1
1+θ
(82)
µσρηA (1− λ) = ψA
(
1− η + ηλ+ ηµA − η
1− η + ηλ
) 1
1+θ
, µA =
λ
1− ψA (83)
⇒ (1− λ)λσηρ =
(
1− η(1−
λ
1−ψA )
1− η + ηλ
) 1
1+θ
ψA(1− ψA)σηρ. (84)
Let ψ˜F,1 denote the solution to equation (84), which is a function of λ.
• Case 3.2: Multiple steady states arise if the concave part of the law of motion is
at least tangent with the 45◦ line at point M, i.e., wt+1 = wt = wM ∈ (wA, w¯F ),
JM ≡ ∂wt+1∂wt ‖wM = 1, and r∗ = rA = ρ(1 − η + ηµA).31 Let DM ≡ 1 − 
−(1+θ)
M and
N ≡ ηλ
1−η+ ηλ
1−ψA
. Combine the three conditions with equations (44)- (46) to get
wM ∈ (wA, w¯F ), ⇒
(
ψMM
ψAA
) 1
σ
=
wM
wA
=
(
µM
µA
)ρη
=
(
1− ψA
1− ψM
)ρη
, (85)
rM = r
∗ = rA = ρ(1− η + ηµA), ⇒ DM = NψM
1− ψM > ηψM , (86)
JM = 1, ⇒ 1− 1
ψM(ηρσ + 1)
= SM =
DM
1 + θ(1−DM) . (87)
Combine equations (86) and (87) to get[
σ +
1
ηρ(θ + 1)
]
D
2
M −
[
N
ηρ(1 + 1
θ
)
+ σ
]
DM +
N
ηρ
= 0. (88)
DM is a root of equation (88).
32 Combine it with equation (86) to solve for ψM
and M = (1 −DM)−
1
1+θ . Plug them and A =
(
1−η+ηλ
1−η+η λ
1−ψA
)− 1
1+θ
in equation (85)
to solve ψ˜F,2 as a function of λ.
The boundary between region AB and A is characterized by ψ˜F = min{ψ˜F,1, ψ˜F,2}.
31The analysis is almost identical as deriving the boundary between region BC and C, except for
r∗ = rA = ρ(1− η + ηµA).
32According to equation (88), there are two roots for Dt. However, only one root satisfies the condition
of DM > ηψM .
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